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INTRODUCTION
It is almost an article of faith among those who advise employers
that it is simply too risky to provide another employer a detailed
employment reference of a former employee.1 The fear of defamation
suits and related claims leads many employers to refuse to provide
meaningful information about a past employee’s job performance in
response to a reference request.2 Indeed, most employers are unwilling
to provide any information beyond an employee’s job title and dates of
employment.3
1. See J. Hoult Verkerke, Legal Regulation of Employment Reference Practices, 65
U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 135 (1998) (explaining that providing a negative reference “creates a risk
of  defamation  liability  while  offering  few  clear  benefits  to  the  referring  employer”).
2. Markita D. Cooper, Job Reference Immunity Statutes: Prevalent but Irrelevant, 11
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2002).
3. Compare id. (stating that limiting job references to information such as job title
and dates of employment   are   “now   the   standards   for   many   businesses”),   with Matthew W.
Finkin & Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Solving the Employee Reference Problem: Lessons from the
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If there is a silver bullet to a defamation claim, however, it is the
defense of consent, or  “volenti non fit injuria (‘to the willing no injury
is done’).”4 An employer who provides a negative reference concerning
an employee enjoys a privilege in an ensuing defamation action if the
employee has consented to the release of information concerning the
employee’s job performance.5 Thus, many attorneys now advise
prospective employers to have applicants sign consent agreements,
permitting the prospective employer to conduct an investigation into the
applicant’s work history and releasing from liability anyone who
provides information about the employee’s work history.6
The use of waiver agreements involves some difficult questions
about the extent to which an employee’s consent should shield a
responding employer from liability. Consider the following
hypotheticals. For each, assume that when applying for a new job, the
applicant or employee signs a consent form authorizing any former
employer to release information  concerning  the  individual’s job history
and releasing the former employer from all liability for the disclosure:
Hypothetical 1
Employer tells Employee he is being fired for failing to
generate sufficient revenue. Employee disputes this reason
at the time of his firing. Employee applies for a new job.
Employer falsely informs the prospective employer that
Employee was fired for padding his expense report.
Employee sues Employer on a defamation theory.
Employer defends on the grounds that Employee consented
to the release of the negative information.
Hypothetical 2
Employer fires Employee but refuses to provide
Employee with any explanation as to Employer’s reasons.
Employee applies for a new job. Employer falsely informs
the prospective employer that Employee was fired due to
his “criminal lifestyle.”   Employee sues Employer on a
defamation theory. Employer defends on the grounds that
Employee consented to the release of the negative
information.
Hypothetical 3
German Experience, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 387, 390 (2009) (stating that in 2004, 53% of
employers refused to provide any information on a former employee due to fear of litigation).
4. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Johnson, 726 A.2d 172, 176 (D.C. 1999).
5. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977).
6. See infra notes 39–41 and accompanying text.
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Prospective Employer hires Third Party to conduct a
background check on Applicant. Third Party is grossly
negligent in conducting the check and mistakenly informs
Prospective Employer that Applicant had been convicted of
two felonies. Although  mistaken  about  Applicant’s  history,  
Third Party honestly believes the information conveyed is
true. Applicant sues Third Party on a defamation theory.
Third Party defends on the grounds that Applicant
consented to the release of the negative information.
As this Article discusses, there is a good chance that the defendants
will prevail in each of these hypothetical cases.7 Employment reference
cases have received significant attention from legal scholars over the
past two decades.8 State legislatures have also focused attention on the
issue during that time.9 Despite the attention devoted to the general
subject of employment references, one issue that has received relatively
little discussion is the issue of consent and the extent to which consent
is and should be a defense in defamation cases.
Indeed, it appears that few people have noticed (or at least addressed
in any detail) one important fact: The rules regarding the defense of
consent in the defamation context are radically different than the normal
rules regarding consent in other intentional tort cases. And, at least as
they are often applied in practice, these rules tend to benefit defendants
and dramatically expand the boundaries of the consent defense. As a
result, by relying upon consent agreements that release employers from
liability for providing negative references, employers are frequently
able to avoid liability in the employment reference context when
application of the traditional rules regarding the consent defense might
not bar recovery. This Article focuses on this phenomenon.
Part I provides background on the employment reference scenario
7. Each hypothetical is based (at least loosely) on real cases discussed in this Article. See
infra notes 145–52, 169–77, 188–92 and accompanying text.
8. E.g., Deborah A. Ballam, Employment References—Speak No Evil, Hear No Evil: A
Proposal for Meaningful Reform, 39 AM. BUS. L.J. 445 (2002); Frank J. Cavico, Defamation in
the Private Sector: The Libelous and Slanderous Employer, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 405 (1999);
Cooper, supra note 2; Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3; Terry Ann Halbert & Lewis
Maltby, Reference Check Gridlock: A Proposal for Escape, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 395
(1998); Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Employer (Ir)rationality and the Demise of
Employment References, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 123 (1992); Connie Swemba, “To  Tell  the  Truth,  the
Whole Truth, and Nothing but   the   Truth:”   Employment   References   and   Tort   Liability, 33 U.
TOL. L. REV. 847 (2002); Verkerke, supra note 1; John Ashby, Note, Employment References:
Should Employers Have an Affirmative Duty to Report Employee Misconduct to Inquiring
Prospective Employers?, 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 117 (2004).
9. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 11 (noting the rise of state statutes addressing this issue
in the 1990s and that by 2000, thirty-six states had such statutes in place).
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and employers’ use of waiver agreements to reduce their risk of
liability. Part II discusses the consent defense in intentional tort cases
and how the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines the consent defense
differently in defamation cases. Part III examines how courts—often
relying upon the Restatement (Second) of Torts—have dealt specifically
with the consent defense in employment reference cases. Part IV
examines the historical origins of the special consent rules and argues
that the Restatement approach to the consent defense is contrary to the
historical treatment of the defense and the justifications underlying it. In
addition, it argues that traditional notions of consent have little
application in the employment reference context given the lack of any
meaningful choice on an employee’s part as to whether to consent to the
release of information. Accordingly, Part V offers a restatement of the
rules regarding consent in the defamation and employment reference
contexts.
I. THE EMPLOYER REFERENCE PROBLEM
The employer reference problem is simple enough to understand.
When hiring new employees, prospective employers hope to obtain
references from former employers in order to hire quality employees
and avoid the liability that may ensue from hiring an incompetent or
potentially dangerous employee.10 However, former employers are
reluctant to provide meaningful references for fear of liability, most
notably defamation claims.11 As a result, many employers have adopted
a policy of confirming only the fact that the applicant once worked for
the employer and the dates of employment.12 This Part examines the
legal rules governing employment references, including the role of
consent and release agreements.
A. The Reference Gridlock
The number of lawsuits stemming from negative references is
relatively small.13 In addition, plaintiffs have had only limited success
in bringing such suits.14 Despite this, employers are highly reluctant to
10. See Katherine A. Peebles, Negligent Hiring and the Information Age: How State
Legislatures Can Save Employers from Inevitable Liability, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1397,
1399–400   (2012)   (noting   employers’   potential   liability   for   failing   to   conduct   adequate  
background checks when hiring individuals with dangerous proclivities).
11. See supra notes 1–3 and accompanying text.
12. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
13. See Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3 (stating   that   “the   incidence   of   litigation  
remains a miniscule two percent or less”);;   see also, e.g., Swemba, supra note 8, at 859–60
(noting that as of 2001, there were only eight reported defamation cases in Ohio stemming from
employment references).
14. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 8, at 136–37 (summarizing employment-related
defamation case law and concluding that the number of successful defamation claims based on

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2481938

724

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66

provide more than limited information in response to a request for an
employment reference.15 In fact, a 2004 survey of human resources
professionals found that 53% of respondents refused to provide any
information regarding a former employee.16
Prospective employers are unable to make fully informed hiring
decisions when they cannot obtain meaningful information about
potential hires.17 The unwillingness of responding employers to provide
detailed information about an applicant’s work history results in
something of a mixed bag for applicants. Good employees may
potentially suffer because responding employers do not provide the kind
of favorable opinions and detailed information about an employee’s
work performance that might make a difference in the hiring process.18
Incompetent employees are shielded from the types of disclosures that
might dissuade a prospective employer from hiring the employee.19
Ultimately, society as a whole suffers as employers frequently make
inefficient decisions because they receive incomplete information.20
In an effort to break the information gridlock surrounding employer
references, the clear majority of states have enacted reference immunity
statutes.21 Although the details vary, the statutes provide employers with
at least qualified or conditional immunity from liability when they
respond to a request for an employment reference.22 Typically, this
immunity may be lost upon a showing that the employer knowingly or
recklessly provided false information to the requesting employer or
otherwise acted in bad faith.23
The primary legal concern for responding employers in a reference
negative references is relatively small and has likely not increased over time).
15. Cooper, supra note 2, at 3.
16. Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 390.
17. See Halbert & Maltby, supra note 8, at 395.
18. See Swemba, supra note 8, at 847 (suggesting that employees who are able to produce
references are at an advantage over those who cannot).
19. See, e.g., Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 388–89  (“[I]t  has  been  reported  that  
forty percent of applicant resumes have discrepancies in educational or employment
history . . . .”).
20. See Verkerke, supra note 1, at 133 (noting the problem of mismatching between
employers and employees that occurs when employers must make employment decisions based
on inadequate information). Compare Swemba, supra note  8,  at  850  (“[E]mployment  references  
provide employers with necessary information so they can effectively hire the right person for
the  job.”),   with Halbert & Maltby, supra note 8, at 403 (discussing the societal and economic
harm flowing from the reference gridlock, in which employees cannot show how qualified they
are for positions and employers cannot efficiently identify suitable applicants for positions).
21. See supra note 9.
22. Cooper, supra note 2, at 15–16.
23. Id. at   16.   Some   states   employ   a   “clear   and   convincing”   standard   rather   than   the  
traditional preponderance of the evidence standard when it comes to the loss of the privilege.
See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.095 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Reg. Sess. of the 23rd Legis.).
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situation is a defamation lawsuit.24 A false and defamatory reference—
even one framed in the form of an opinion25—may potentially subject a
responding employer to liability.26 By providing responding employers
with qualified or conditional immunity, the statutes seek to alleviate this
concern.27 However, employers have long enjoyed a qualified privilege
at common law when providing an employment reference. This
privilege is based on the societal interest in the free flow of information
in the reference context.28 Thus, in most states, the reference immunity
statutes simply track common law rules and provide little if any
additional protection for responding employers.29
Moreover, the existence of a conditional privilege often hinges on
the fact-specific question of whether the responding employer knew the
information provided was false, acted in reckless disregard of the truth
or falsity of the reference, or otherwise acted in bad faith.30 As a result,
some cases are not easily resolvable on pretrial motions.31 Even when
employers prevail on privilege questions, they have still been forced to
incur the costs of defending the lawsuit while receiving no benefit from
providing the reference in the first place.32 Seeing only risk and little
benefit in providing detailed information, most employers have retained
their policy of providing only limited information when responding to a
reference request.33 Indeed, despite the proliferation of employment
24. See Verkerke, supra note 1, at 135.
25. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 1, 21 (1990) (holding that there is no
constitutional privilege for statements of opinion in defamation actions).
26. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 558 (1977) (listing elements of a defamation
claim).
27. See Cooper, supra note 2, at 15–16.
28. Compare Calero v. Del Chem. Corp., 228 N.W.2d 737, 744 (Wis. 1975) (recognizing
the societal utility in encouraging   the   free   flow   of   information   between   an   applicant’s   former  
and prospective employers), with Cooper, supra note 2, at 9 (noting that employers enjoy a
conditional or qualified privilege under common law).
29. Verkerke, supra note 1, at 132; see, e.g., Kevorkian v. Glass, 913 A.2d 1043, 1048
(R.I. 2007).
30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
31. Cooper, supra note 2, at 9–10 (noting that abuse of the immunity privilege is a
question of fact that generally requires jury resolution).
32. Ballam, supra note   8,   at   447   (“Rather   than   fearing   losing,   employers   fear   the   legal
expenses   associated   even   with   lawsuits   they   successfully   defend.”);;   Finkin   &   Dau-Schmidt,
supra note 3, at 402 (noting that most appellate decisions concerning references are decided in
favor of employers  on  summary  judgment  and  “[c]onsequently,  the  costs  that  cause  employers  
to shrink from providing references are the . . . the costs of appearing in court at all: not the
prospect of failing to persuade in a motion for summary judgment, but the cost of making the
motion”).  
33. See Kenneth Glenn Dau-Schmidt, Employment in the New Age of Trade and
Technology: Implications for Labor and Employment Law, 76 IND. L.J. 1, 16 (2001) (arguing
that the reference gridlock is driven by the fact that responding employers bear the risks
associated with references but receive none of the benefits).
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reference statutes in recent years, the evidence suggests that employers
are now even less likely than before to provide detailed information in
response to a reference request.34
B. The Use of Waiver Agreements in Reference Cases
Perhaps the safest route for an employer to avoid liability for
providing a negative employment reference is to obtain the employee’s
consent in advance. Although some courts have held that an  employee’s  
consent provides a responding employer with only a qualified or
conditional privilege,35 consent is typically recognized as an absolute
privilege in a defamation action.36 Therefore, obtaining an employee’s
prior consent to the release of information may help an employer avoid
the problems associated with trying to preserve a conditional privilege.
An employee can enter into a valid consent agreement with either
the prospective employer or the responding employer. If the employee
enters into an agreement with the prospective employer, the employee
can agree to release a responding employer from liability for its
provision of a reference.37 As is the case with the consent defense
outside the defamation context, some courts have held that an
agreement between the employee and a prospective employer
effectively shields the responding employer even if the responding
employer is not aware of the agreement.38
As a result of these advantages, those who advise employers are
increasingly advising their clients to obtain a written release from a job
applicant prior to conducting an investigation into the employee’s
background.39 It is now common for prospective employers to require
34. Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 390.
35. Miron v. Univ. of New Haven Police Dept., 931 A.2d 847, 854 (Conn. 2007)
(recognizing a qualified or conditional privilege for employment references solicited with the
employee’s   consent);;   Dellorusso   v.   Monteiro,   714   N.E.2d   362,   365   (Mass.   App.   Ct.   1999)  
(stating that   “limit   of   the   privilege   is   a   good   faith   belief   by   the   person   who   published   the  
defamatory material that it was true”);;   see, e.g., McClesky v. Vericon Res., Inc., 589 S.E.2d
854,   856   (Ga.   Ct.   App.   2003)   (concluding   that   the   employee’s   agreement   to   release the
employer from any liability resulting from a background check was binding absent evidence of
gross negligence or willful misconduct).
36. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977).
37. E.g., Smith v. Holley, 827 S.W.2d 433, 436 (Tex. 1992).
38. E.g., Woodfield v. Providence Hosp., 779 A.2d 933, 937 (D.C. 2001). This is also the
general rule outside the defamation context. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892 cmt.
b, illus. 1 (1979) (concluding that A’s  statement  to  B that any of B’s  neighbors  are  welcome to
use A’s  pool  gives  C, a neighbor, consent to use the pool even though C was not aware of A’s  
statement).
39. E.g., Boyd A. Byers, Keep Imposters Out of Your Workplace, 18 KAN. EMP. L.
LETTER, no. 7, Oct. 2011 (“Make   applicants   sign   a   waiver   that authorizes educational
institutions and former employers to release information about them and allows you to verify the
information.”);;   Jillian Dearing, Employment References Release, ALLBUSINESS,
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applicants to sign forms authorizing the release of job information by
former employers and releasing former employers from liability.40
Indeed, one recent employment practitioner newsletter speculated that
“it won’t be surprising if many employers make written consent to the
collection of expanded employment reference information a condition
of the application process.”41 Thus, consent agreements are likely to
take on increased importance as employers seek to break the reference
gridlock and obtain relevant information concerning job applicants.
Some employers seek to take advantage of the consent defense
simply by having applicants indicate on an employment application that
it is permissible for the prospective employer to contact current or
former employers for a reference.42 Others have applicants sign a form
authorizing past employers and others to release information related to
the employee’s job performance and releasing these parties from all
forms of liability if they do.43 Some consent agreements are more
specific still, limiting the scope of consent to where the employer
provides information in good faith and without malice based on a
reasonable belief that the information contained is true.44
Given the wealth of information that is potentially available
concerning a prospective hire and the difficulty employers experience in
obtaining references from other employers, some employers hire third
http://www.allbusiness.com/human-resources/workplace-health-safety/3876513-1.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2014) (advising employers to obtain in advance release forms from employees authoring
employers to disclose information); Halbert & Maltby, supra note 8, at 414 (noting that it is
“common  for  employers  (or  their  agents)  to  have  prospective  employees  sign  releases”); Susan
Hartmus Hiser, Growing Your Business: The Dos and Don’ts of Hiring, Part 3, 22 MICH. EMP.
L. LETTER, no. 10, Dec. 2011 (recommending that employers have job applicants sign a release
during the application process); Matthew L. Mac Kelly, Employer Liability for Employment
References, 81 WIS. LAW., Apr. 2008, at 8, 54–55 (advising employers to obtain a release prior
to providing a reference); Linnea B. McCord, Defamation vs. Negligent Referral, 2 GRAZIADIO
BUS. REV., no. 2, 1999, available at http://gbr.pepperdine.edu/2010/08/defamation-vs-negligentreferral  (“Whenever  possible,  obtain  a  written  release  from  the  former  employee  that  authorizes  
providing  references  before  doing  so.”).
40. Cf. DAVID J. WALSH, EMPLOYMENT LAW FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PRACTICE 153 (2013)
(stating that most prospective employers ask applicants to sign releases of information on their
job applications).
41. Mark M. Schorr, ‘Employer   Reference   Immunity’   Bill   Advances   Unanimously, 17
NEB. EMP. L. LETTER, no. 6, Apr. 2012, at 1.
42. E.g., Miron v. Univ. of New Haven Police Dept., 931 A.2d 847, 849 n.3 (Conn. 2007);
Gengler v. Phelps, 589 P.2d 1056, 1057 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
43. E.g., Cox v. Nasche, 70 F.3d 1030, 1031 (9th Cir. 1995)  (“I  Release  any  individual,  
including records custodians, from all liability for damages that may result to me on account of
compliance   or   any   attempts   to   comply   with   this   authorization.” (quoting Federal Aviation
Administration release)).
44. E.g., Nigro v. St. Joseph Med. Ctr., 371 S.W.3d 808, 813 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012)
(involving a clause in a consent agreement that limited release from liability to disclosures
provided in good faith).
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parties to conduct background checks into the histories of their
applicants.45 The actions of these third-party investigators are subject to
a number of legal restrictions, including potential liability for
defamation.46 As a result, some consent agreements entered into by
prospective employees are written broadly enough to cover the actions
of these third-party investigators, thereby raising a question as to
whether these parties may claim an absolute privilege in a subsequent
defamation claim.47
II. THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN DEFAMATION CASES
The basic contours of the consent defense in tort law are well
established. However, tort law has devoted significantly less attention to
the concept of consent than has contract law, where the intention of the
parties is fundamental.48 As a result, there are fewer rules dealing with
the concept of consent in tort law than in contract law.49 Moreover, the
rules that do exist are considerably ambiguous. The following section
explores the general rules that apply to the defense of consent and how
those rules conflict with the special rules associated with the defense of
consent in defamation cases.
A. The Defense of Consent Generally
Consent is ordinarily treated as an absolute defense in intentional tort
cases.50 Consent may be actual or apparent in nature; either can be
effective to bar liability. Actual consent exists when an individual is

45. Verkerke, supra note 1, at 130.
46. See Cruz v. Behnke, No. 3:04CV1119, 2006 WL 860104, at *1–2 (D. Conn. Mar. 31,
2006) (involving a defamation claim stemming from a third  party’s  background  check).  The  Fair  
Credit Reporting Act governs the use of third parties to conduct background checks and
requires, inter alia, that an employee or applicant gives consent to a credit check before the
background check is conducted. 15 U.S.C § 1681m(d)(1)(D) (2012). However, civil actions are
not available for failure to comply with this requirement. Id. § 1681m(h)(8)(A).
47. But see Cruz, 2006 WL 860104, at *2 n.1 (noting that the existence of a release
authorizing a background check and releasing defendants from resulting liability did not absolve
defendants from defamation from disseminating inaccurate information).
48. Tom W. Bell, Graduated Consent in Contract and Tort Law: Toward a Theory of
Justification, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 17, 36 (2010). See generally Kenneth W. Simons,
Assumption of Risk and Consent in the Law of Torts: A Theory of Full Preference, 67 B.U. L.
REV. 213 (1987) (noting that the concept of consent in tort law is ill-defined and proposing a
new theory of full preference for consent and assumption of risk in tort law).
49. Bell, supra note 48, at 36.
50. E.g., Edgcomb v. Lower Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 859 (Wyo.
1996)   (stating   that   “consent   of   the   possessor   .   .   .   is   an   absolute   defense   to   trespass”   (quoting
Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colo. Cent. Credit Union, 793 P.2d 470, 475 (Wyo. 1990)); see also,
e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §  13  cmt.  d  (1965)  (stating  that  a  plaintiff’s  consent  to  a  
harmful or offensive contact will defeat a battery claim).
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willing for the conduct to occur and manifests this willingness.51
Apparent consent exists when the defendant reasonably understands the
plaintiff’s words or actions to convey a willingness to permit the
conduct in question.52 Therefore, apparent consent may exist even
where the defendant is mistaken about the plaintiff’s willingness for
conduct to occur, provided the defendant is justified in the belief.53 The
question of whether a plaintiff consented to the defendant’s conduct is
typically reserved for a jury.54 For consent to be effective, an individual
must consent in advance to the particular conduct that occurs or to
conduct that is substantially the same.55 If the defendant exceeds the
scope of consent, consent is no longer effective for the exceeding
conduct.56
1. Consent to the Particular Conduct or Substantially the Same
Conduct
For consent to be effective, the plaintiff must consent in advance to
the particular wrongful conduct that occurs or to substantially the same
conduct. Minor differences between the conduct consented to and that
which actually occurs do not prevent the plaintiff’s consent from being
effective.57 However,   a   party’s consent to a fistfight is not consent to
being stabbed in the fight.58 A  party’s  consent  to   permit   a neighbor to
“dump  a  few  stones”  on  the  party’s land is not consent to cover the land
with large boulders.59
The requirement that an individual consent to the particular conduct
of the defendant helps ensure that the plaintiff appreciated the risks
involved. Like the defense of assumption of the risk in negligence cases,
appreciation of the risks involved is central to the concept of consent.60
For example, the Restatement (Second) of Torts implies that an
individual lacks the capacity to consent when the individual is incapable
of   “appreciating   the   nature,   extent   and   probable   consequences   of   the  
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(1) (1979).
52. Id. § 892(2).
53. Id. § 892 cmt. c.
54. Lewis v. LeGrow, 670 N.W.2d 675, 688 (Mich. Ct. App. 2003).
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(b).
56. Id. § 892(4).
57. Id. (stating that consent is effective   when   the   defendant’s   wrongful   conduct   is
substantially the same as the conduct to which the plaintiff consented).
58. Teolis v. Moscatelli, 119 A. 161, 162 (R.I. 1923); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 892A cmt. c.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. c., illus. 1.
60. See Scott v. Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 13 (Wash. 1992) (en banc)
(explaining   that   “[i]mplied   primary assumption of risk arises where a plaintiff has impliedly
consented . . . to relieve defendant of a duty to plaintiff regarding specific known and
appreciated  risks”).
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conduct   consented   to.”61 As one court explained,   “The doctrine of
‘volenti non fit injuria’ presupposes a knowledge of the facts so that the
actor has a choice.”62 Thus, the judicial choice to recognize consent as
an absolute defense has been defended as an efficient means of
promoting autonomy.63
An individual need not have perfect foresight for consent to be
effective;;   absolute   certainty   with   respect   to   the   defendant’s   future  
actions is not required.64 Similarly, the fact that the consequences of the
defendant’s   actions   turned   out   to   be   more   severe   than the plaintiff
predicted does not prevent consent from being effective.65 However, the
plaintiff still must recognize the otherwise wrongful nature of the
defendant’s   conduct   so   that   the   plaintiff   can   appreciate   the   risks  
involved. As the Restatement (Second) of Torts explains, consent is
“confined to conduct that the plaintiff knows the other is engaging in
with the intent of invading the plaintiff’s interests.”66 Thus, consent to
eating candy offered by the defendant is not consent to eating poisoned
candy,67 not   simply   because   the   defendant’s   conduct   was   of   a  
substantially different nature, but because the plaintiff lacked the
knowledge regarding the candy, which was necessary to allow the
plaintiff to make a meaningful choice with respect to the risks involved.
This   focus   on   the   plaintiff’s   appreciation   of   the   risks   involved   in  
consent also helps explain the exceptions to the general rule of consent.
An  individual’s  consent  is  ineffective  when  the  consent  was  induced  as  
a result of a substantial mistake on  the  individual’s  part  concerning  the  
nature of the invasion or the extent of its harm, and the defendant knew
of the mistake or induced it through a misrepresentation.68 In these
61. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. b; see also Cardwell v. Bechtol,
724 S.W.2d 739, 746 (Tenn. 1987) (applying the Restatement standard).
62. Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863, 870 (Tex. 1961).
63. See Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt: Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 75
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 165,  169  (2007)  (“The  ability  to  consent  is  recognized  in  moral  philosophy
as   a   central   manifestation   of   personhood   and   individual   autonomy.”);;   Mark   A.   Geistfeld,   The
Value of Consumer Choice in Products Liability, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 781,  781  (2009)  (“The  role  
of consent within tort law derives from the value of individual autonomy or selfdetermination.”);;  Gary  T.  Scwhartz,  Reality in Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law
Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377,   401   n.120   (1994)   (stating   that   “the   goal   of   informed  
consent [in the doctor–patient scenario] is not improved patient safety but rather improved
patient  autonomy”).
64. Pan E. Exploration Co. v. Hufo Oils, 855 F.2d 1106, 1129 (5th Cir. 1988).
65. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides as an example the situation in which A
consents to B punching A in the chest, but unbeknownst to either party, A has a heart condition
and dies as a result of the punch. A’s  consent  to  B’s  particular  conduct  would still be effective.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. e, illus. 5.
66. Id. § 892A cmt. a.
67. Id. § 53 cmt. a, illus. 1.
68. Id. § 892B(2).
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situations,  the  plaintiff’s  choice  to  submit  to  the  defendant’s  conduct  is  
based on an inaccurate assessment of the risks involved. It would be
unfair to the defendant in this scenario to deny him the defense of
consent  if  the  defendant  were  unaware  of  the  plaintiff’s  mistake.  But  if  
the defendant should recognize that the plaintiff would not have
consented   but   for   the   mistake,   the   plaintiff’s   failure   to   appreciate   the  
true risks involved should vitiate the consent.69
2. Exceeding the Scope of Consent
Closely related to the idea that an individual must consent to the
particular conduct at issue is the question of whether the defendant has
exceeded the scope of consent. Sometimes the boundaries of the
defendant’s conduct to which the plaintiff has consented may not be
clear. This lack of clarity is often present when the plaintiff’s consent is
apparent in nature and arises from silence or inaction.70
The task of determining the scope of consent may be easier where
the plaintiff has actually expressed willingness to the defendant for
particular conduct to occur, especially where the parties have entered
into a formal agreement regarding the plaintiff’s consent that releases
the defendant from liability.71 The Restatement (Second) of Contracts
actually adopts the rule that a contractual term releasing a party from
tort liability for intentional or reckless conduct is unenforceable on
public policy grounds.72 A handful of courts have adopted this approach
and refused to enforce such provisions.73 However, under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, an agreement releasing a party from
liability for intentional wrongdoing is enforceable, subject to a number
of limitations.74 An individual may expressly assume the risk of harm
69. See id. § 892B(2) cmt. f (explaining that for a mistake to render consent ineffective,
the mistake must   be   substantial,   meaning   that   it   is   “of   such   a   character   that   the   actor   is   not  
justified in assuming that the other would have given his consent if he had had knowledge of
it”).
70. See generally id. § 892 cmt. c (noting that apparent consent may arise from silence or
inaction).
71. Often, when a plaintiff consents to otherwise wrongful conduct, there is no explicit
agreement that the plaintiff is also releasing the defendant from any ensuing liability. The
plaintiff’s  consent  in  such  a  case would be still effective to prevent liability in accordance with
the   rules   discussed   throughout   this   Article.   However,   the   terms   “waiver”   and   “release”  
necessarily   imply   an   agreement   that   the   plaintiff   consents   to   the   defendant’s   conduct   and
releases the defendant from any ensuing liability. See Simons, supra note 48, at 224–25
(discussing this idea).
72. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 195 (1981).
73. See Edward R. Horkan, Note, Contracting Around the Law of Defamation and
Employment References, 79 VA. L. REV. 517, 533–34 (1993) (discussing Elmer v. Coplin, 485
So. 2d 171, 177 (La. Ct. App. 1986) and Kellums v. Fright Sales Ctrs., Inc., 667 So .2d 816, 817
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)).
74. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B (1965) (discussing the effect and
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flowing from another’s conduct through consent in a written release or
waiver from liability.75 However, the Restatement (Second) of Torts
makes clear that broadly worded agreements—particularly those drafted
by the defendant—are unlikely to be effective to relieve the defendant
of liability. The terms of such an agreement “must . . . [be] brought
home to [the plaintiff] and understood by him, before it can be found
that he has accepted them.”76 This means that “general clauses
exempting the defendant from all liability for loss or damage will not be
construed to include loss or damage resulting from his
intentional . . . misconduct, unless the circumstances clearly indicate
that such was the plaintiff’s understanding and intention.”77
As is the case in contract law, tort law views consent from an
objective viewpoint, with the scope of consent determined by the
circumstances.78 Ambiguity in the case of a written agreement releasing
a defendant from liability is construed against the drafter.79 Where a
release amounts to a contract, general rules of contract interpretation
should apply. Thus, for example, an implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing exists in a release as it does in all contracts.80 At a minimum,
good faith requires honesty in the performance of the contract.81 But
“bad faith” may include other forms of conduct, such as “evasion of the
spirit of the bargain,” “willful rendering of imperfect performance,
[and] abuse of a power to specify terms.”82
Ambiguity as to the scope of consent is more likely to exist where
limits of express assumption of risk).
75. See Day v. Snowmass Stables, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 289, 294 (D. Colo. 1993) (treating
an exculpatory agreement as a contract); Phelps v. Firebird Raceway, Inc., 111 P.3d 1003, 1013
(Ariz. 2005) (en banc) (referring to a release agreement as a form of contractual assumption of
risk); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. b (referencing section dealing
with consent   and   providing   that   “the   parties   may   agree   that the defendant shall not be liable
even  for  conduct  intended  to  invade  the  plaintiff’s  interests”);;  Joseph  H.  King,  Jr.,  Exculpatory
Agreements for Volunteers in Youth Activities—The   Alternative   to   “Nerf®”   Tiddlywinks, 53
OHIO ST. L.J. 683, 696–97 (1992) (discussing the validity of exculpatory agreements in youth
sports dealing with intentional wrongs).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. c.
77. Id. § 496B cmt. d.
78. See Bell, supra note 48, at 24; see also Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of
Contract, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 304 (1986) (discussing consent in terms of an objective
manifestation  of  a  party’s  intent  to  alienate  rights).
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496B cmt. d.
80. See SEC v. Warren, 534 F.3d 1368, 1369–70 (11th Cir. 2008) (recognizing the
existence of a duty in a consent agreement); Braidfoot v. William Carey Coll., 793 So. 2d 642,
651 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (considering the plaintiff’s  claim  of  breach  of  duty  of  good  faith and
fair dealing in performance of a settlement agreement); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§  205  (1981)  (“Every  contract  imposes  upon  each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in
its  performance  and  its  enforcement.”).
81. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a, d.
82. Id.
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the plaintiff’s consent is apparent in nature. Without an express
agreement between the parties or at least the plaintiff’s expressed
willingness to allow particular conduct to occur, courts and juries may
be forced to sift through the parties’ conflicting subjective
understandings and desires to arrive at a conclusion as to what the
defendant reasonably could have believed.83 Therefore, courts tend to be
more circumspect in their willingness to find that a plaintiff consented
to particular conduct when the consent is apparent in nature as opposed
to express.84
B. The Defense of Consent in Defamation Cases
In addition to the general sections on the role of consent in tort cases,
§ 583 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts is devoted specifically to the
role of consent in defamation cases.85 Courts have frequently relied
upon § 583 when deciding issues of consent in defamation cases.86 A
comment to § 583 provides that the section is a specific application of
the general rules regarding consent discussed above (in reference to
§ 892 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts).87 This is not true. On their
face, the comments to § 583 articulate an entirely different standard for
determining whether an individual has consented to a defamatory
publication.
1. Section 583’s Departure from the General Rules of Consent
a. Application of the General Consent Standard to Defamation
Cases
Section 583 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts alters the more
general rules regarding consent by eliminating the requirement that a
plaintiff consent to the particular conduct or to substantially the same
conduct. In addition, the section alters the rules regarding the scope of
consent. If one were to apply the general rules contained in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts for determining whether express consent
exists in the case of a defamatory statement, the analogue would be
something like the following illustrations:
Illustration 1: A, knowing that his personnel file from the
time he worked at B Company contains notations of
unexcused absences from work, tells B Company that it
may disclose information related to his job performance
83. See Simons, supra note 48, at 252 (discussing the subjectivity involved in determining
whether apparent consent existed).
84. See Bell, supra note 48, at 19.
85. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977).
86. See, e.g., infra notes 129–133, 152–64 and accompanying text.
87. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. b.
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while at B Company to C, a prospective employer. B
informs C of the instances of A’s unexcused absences. A
has consented to this conduct.
A expressly consented to the particular conduct of B’s publication of
facts related to A’s attendance. Knowing the defamatory information
contained in the personnel file, A appreciated the risk that B would
disclose this information. B, by disclosing only what A consented to, did
not exceed the scope of the consent given. Therefore, A’s consent would
be effective and would render B’s publication absolutely privileged. The
belt-and-suspenders lawyer representing B would probably insist that the
consent be in writing and that it expressly release B from all forms of
liability, including defamation. But A’s   statement,   standing   alone,  
should probably suffice to shield B from liability.
Illustration 2: The same facts as in Illustration 1, except
that B maliciously and falsely informs C that A had stolen
company property while employed at A Company. A has
not consented to this conduct.
The conduct that occurred in Illustration 2—lying about A’s   job  
performance—was substantially different than that to which A
consented: A’s consent to the publication of one type of defamatory
statement is not consent to the publication of a completely different type
of defamatory statement.88 A consented to B’s responding in good faith
to a reference request. Any dishonest conduct on B’s   part   would   be  
substantially different in nature. In this case, lying about A’s   job  
performance would be the equivalent of B stabbing A after A had
consented to a fistfight, or B covering A’s property with boulders after A
had consented to B’s dumping a few stones on A’s property.89 Nor
would the doctrine of apparent consent protect B. B might be justified in
believing that A agreed to B’s disclosure of truthful but defamatory
information about his job performance, but B could not reasonably
believe that A agreed to allow B to deliberately lie about his job
performance. While A’s   silence   as   to   the   exact   nature   of   permissible  
disclosure might be understood as manifesting consent to a range of
defamatory publications, it cannot reasonably be understood as
manifesting consent to a false and defamatory publication. Therefore,
B’s  conduct would not be the particular conduct or substantially similar
conduct to which A may have apparently consented.90
88. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 58–59 and accompanying text.
90. Alternatively, one could argue that A’s  consent  is  ineffective  because it was induced
through a substantial mistake of which B was aware: A mistakenly assumed B would act in good
faith in responding to a reference request and B almost certainly knew that this was A’s  
assumption. Regardless of how one reaches the conclusion, the conclusion must be that A’s  

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2481938

2014]

THE FORGOTTEN ROLE OF CONSENT

735

b. Section 583’s “Reason to Know” Standard
As it turns out, if the special consent rules for defamation are applied
as they appear in § 583 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, the
defendant in Illustration 2 would actually prevail, despite the general
rules that typically apply in other intentional tort cases. Comment d to
§ 583 contains the following language:
It is not necessary that the other know that the matter to
the publication of which he consents is defamatory in
character. It is enough that he knows the exact language of
the publication or that he has reason to know that it may be
defamatory. In such a case, by consent to its publication, he
takes the risk that it may be defamatory.91
On its face, this language changes the general consent standard in
several meaningful ways.
First, comment d’s “reason to know” standard does not track the
rules for either actual or apparent consent as described in the general
sections on consent.92 Instead, it creates an entirely different standard
based on whether the plaintiff had “reason to know” that the defendant
“may” say something defamatory about the plaintiff. Comment d’s
observation that the plaintiff’s consent to a defamatory publication is
effective where the plaintiff “knows the exact language of the
publication” roughly tracks the general standard for express consent. In
this situation, the plaintiff expresses willingness for the defendant to use
particular words. Therefore, he has consented to the particular conduct
that occurs. This scenario describes actual consent as that term is
usually defined.93 As one court stated,   “Actual consent requires actual
knowledge  of  the  risk  assumed  by  the  injured  party.”94
But that is clearly something different than having “reason to know”
that a defendant “may” make some type of defamatory publication.
Section   583’s   “reason   to   know”   standard   sounds   suspiciously   like   an  
objective reasonableness standard. In contrast, consent and assumption
of the risk decisions in other contexts typically require that a plaintiff
subjectively comprehend the specific risk involved or that the risk be
consent is ineffective in this illustration.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. d (footnote omitted). The same
language originally appeared in the first Restatement of Torts and was repeated verbatim in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 583 cmt. d (1938).
92. See supra notes 50–84 and accompanying text.
93. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
94. McGraw v. R & R Invs., Ltd., 877 So. 2d 886, 891 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004); see also
John H. Mansfield, Informed Choice in the Law of Torts, 22 LA. L. REV. 17, 31–32 (1961)
(stating   that   consent   exists   when   “the   plaintiff   was   willing   that   a   certain   event   occur”   and  
believes  that  an  invasion  of  an  otherwise  protected  interest  “is  substantially certain to follow the
event”).
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obvious.95 Occasionally, a court may say that the defenses of consent or
assumption of the risk apply when a plaintiff knew or should have
known of the particular risk.96 But   even   this   “should   have   known”  
language is narrower than § 583’s   “reason   to   know”   standard.97 The
focus in most actual consent cases is on whether the plaintiff consented
to the particular conduct in question and appreciated the risks of that
conduct.98 Comment d’s “reason to know” standard also does not
correspond with the general conception of apparent consent. In general,
the concept of apparent consent focuses on what the defendant
reasonably believes, not what the plaintiff might anticipate.99
In addition, comment d’s observation that consent exists where the
plaintiff has reason to know that the publication may be defamatory
does not include the qualifier that the plaintiff must be able to foresee
that the publication would be defamatory in any specific manner. Read
literally, the defendant’s defamatory publication would be absolutely
privileged if the plaintiff had reason to believe that the defendant would
say something defamatory, even if the particular nature of the
defamatory statement was entirely unforeseeable. This literal reading
contrasts the typical requirement—outlined elsewhere in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts—that   “the plaintiff was willing that a
certain event occur.”100
Dean William Prosser likens a plaintiff’s  consent  in  the  situation  in  
which the plaintiff has reason to know that the defendant may convey
something defamatory (but is unsure about the exact nature of the
statement) to the defense of assumption of the risk in the negligence

95. See Turcotte v. Fell, 502 N.E.2d 964, 968 (N.Y. 1986); see also, e.g., Thomas v.
Panco Mgmt., L.L.C., 31 A.3d 583, 591 (Md. 2011); Parness v. Econ. Lab., Inc., 170 N.W.2d
554, 557 (Minn. 1969); Wever v. Hick, 228 N.E.2d 315, 318 (Ohio 1967).
96. Van Tuyn v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 447 So. 2d 318, 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
97. To the extent   courts   reference   a   “reason   to   know”   standard   outside   the defamation
context,   it   is   typically   to   point  out   that   a   plaintiff’s   consent   is   not   effective   when   the   plaintiff  
knew   what   the   defendant’s   conduct   would   be,   but   had   no   reason   to   appreciate   a   specific risk
posed by the conduct. See, e.g., Brown v. Lundell, 344 S.W.2d 863, 869 (Tex. 1961) (stating
that the volenti non fit injuria, or consent, doctrine did not apply since there was no showing that
the  plaintiff  “had  reason  to  know  or  to  be  aware”  that the  defendant’s  conduct  would  probably  
cause a particular result); Simpson v. May, 486 P.2d 336, 338 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971) (stating
the   consent   doctrine   “does   not   apply   in   cases   where   the   injury   to   plaintiff   results from an
extraordinary risk of which plaintiff could not have knowledge or appreciation”).  This  appears  
to   simply   be   another   way   of   saying   that   for   the   consent   defense   to   apply,   the   “plaintiff   must  
have  voluntarily  exposed  himself  to  a  known  and  appreciated  danger.”  Regan  v.  City  of Seattle,
458 P.2d 12, 16 (Wash. 1969).
98. E.g., McGraw,  877  So.  2d  at  891  (“Actual  consent  requires  actual  knowledge  of  the  
risk  assumed  by  the  injured  party.”).
99. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892(2) (1979).
100. Mansfield, supra note 94, at 31 (emphasis added).
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context.101 But only in the most general sense can Dean Prosser’s  
observation be accepted as true.102 First, the Restatement (Second) of
Torts makes clear that the defense of assumption of the risk involves a
subjective standard.103 It is not enough that a reasonable person would
have known the risk involved; the plaintiff must have subjectively
known of the risk.104 In contrast, § 583 employs something like an
objective   standard,   focusing   on   whether   an   individual   had   “reason   to  
know”   that   a   publication   might   be   defamatory.   In   addition, for the
assumption of the risk defense to apply, the plaintiff must fully
understand  the  risks  of  harm  present  in  the  defendant’s  conduct.105 The
plaintiff   must   appreciate   “the nature, character, and extent”   of   the  
danger.106 This necessarily means that the plaintiff appreciates the
specific risks inherent in the activity.107 Thus, the plaintiff who walks in
front of a golfer about to drive the ball may assume the risk of the
golfer’s   negligence   in   failing   to   look   before   he   swings.   It   can   be  
presumed that the plaintiff knew of the risks associated with the
defendant’s  particular conduct. But the same plaintiff does not assume
the risk that a golfer standing over a putter on the green will draw back
and hit the ball with such force as to injure the plaintiff when the
plaintiff walks in front of the other golfer.108 The plaintiff almost
certainly did not know of the risk that the defendant would engage in
this particular conduct and, therefore, could not have assumed the risks
associated with that conduct.
In contrast, comment d to § 583 does not require a plaintiff to
consent to the particular defamatory statement in question before
consent  is  effective.  Therefore,  contrary  to  Prosser’s  assertion, comment
d to § 583 changes the parties’   respective burdens when it comes to
consent in defamation cases. Instead of requiring the defendant to
conform his particular conduct to that which the plaintiff intended to
allow or that which the defendant reasonably believes the plaintiff
101. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 114, at 823 n.95
(5th ed. 1984).
102. The British case that Dean Prosser cites, Chapman v. Ellesmere, [1932] 2 K.B. 431
(Eng.), provides only limited support for his statement. See infra Subsection IV.A.3.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496D cmt. c (1965).
104. Berkebile v. Brantley Helicopter Corp., 337 A.2d 893, 901 (Pa. 1975).
105. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 496C(1).
106. Id. § 496D cmt. b.
107. See Berman v. Radnor Rolls, Inc., 542 A.2d 525, 532 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988); Scott v.
Pac. W. Mountain Resort, 834 P.2d 6, 13 (Wash. 1992) (en banc). The same rule applies in
products liability cases in which a defendant relies upon the defense of assumption of the risk.
See, e.g., Berkebile, 337 A.2d at 901 (stating that a  plaintiff  is  “precluded  from  recovery  only  if  
he knows of the specific defect eventually causing his injury and voluntarily proceeds to use the
product with knowledge of the danger  caused  by  the  defect”).
108. Tavernier v. Maes, 51 Cal. Rptr. 575, 583 (Cal. Ct. App. 1966) (quoting Strand v.
Conner, 20 Cal. Rptr. 584, 586 (Cal. Ct. App. 1962)).
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intended to allow, comment d requires the plaintiff to anticipate the full
range of the defendant’s potential actions. And if it is foreseeable that
the defendant will defame the plaintiff in some manner, the plaintiff is
made to bear the costs of the defendant’s actions. The result is to
provide defendants with greater latitude when it comes to defamatory
publications.
For example, in Illustration 2 above, A knew (or at least had reason
to know) that B might say something defamatory about A’s work
performance related to his attendance. A appreciated this risk. However,
he did not know, nor was the risk obvious, that B would make false and
defamatory statements about his work performance. The concepts of
“falsity” and “defamatory” are separate under defamation law. A
statement is defamatory where it would tend to damage the reputation of
an individual “as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to
deter third persons from associating or dealing with him.”109 Both true
and false statements may have this effect. Thus, a statement may be true
but still defamatory.110 In Illustration 2, A appreciated the risk that an
ensuing reference could be defamatory, but did not appreciate the risk
that it would be false and defamatory or that it would be made
maliciously. Under the general standard outlined elsewhere in the
Restatement (Second) of Torts,111 this would render the consent
ineffective because A did not consent to the particular conduct that
occurred or to substantially the same conduct. But what matters under
§ 583, if that section is read literally, is whether the plaintiff had reason
to know that the ensuing publication might somehow be defamatory.
The fact that the publication in Illustration 2 was defamatory in a way A
could not foresee—namely, a false and malicious way—would be
irrelevant since A could nonetheless foresee that he would be defamed
in some way. Therefore, the fact that B lied would not prevent consent
from being effective.
Importantly, it would be beyond dispute that a defendant could not
escape liability in a battery or trespass action by relying on the consent
defense in similar circumstances. Consider the following illustration as
proof:
Illustration 3: A knows that B needs to reach the street in
front of A’s house to catch a bus. The most direct route for
B to take would be through A’s backyard. A tells B that it is
109. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977).
110. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566  cmt.  a  (noting  “the  normal  requirement  
that  the  communication  be  false  as  well  as  defamatory”);;  see also Carol Rice Andrews, Jones v.
Clinton: A Study in Politically Motivated Suits, Rule 11, and the First Amendment, 2001 BYU
L. REV. 1, 77, 77–78 n.320 (recognizing the distinction).
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(b) (1979).
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permissible for B to cross A’s yard to reach the street. B
then drives his motorcycle through A’s backyard to reach
the bus stop.
B could almost certainly not escape liability for trespass on the basis
of consent. A could reasonably foresee that B might trespass; indeed, A
consented to at least some form of trespass. However, A almost
certainly was not willing to allow B to drive his motorcycle through A’s
backyard, nor could B reasonably believe that A was so willing. A
consented to one type of trespass, not all possible kinds.112 The
comments and illustrations included in the general section on consent in
the Restatement (Second) of Torts confirm this conclusion.113
c. Invited Defamation and § 583’s  Illustration
At first glance, it may seem hard to believe that the Restatement
authors intended such different results in the case of defamation.
Indeed, such a reading would conflict with nearly all of the law more
generally on the subject of consent. However, this seems to be how
Dean Prosser, the reporter of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, viewed
§ 583.114 Moreover, the illustration accompanying comment d supports
the conclusion that the Restatement authors intended to create an
exceptionally broad standard for consent.
The illustration involves a teacher who is “summarily discharged”
and then demands that the employer publish the reason for the firing,
and the employer complies.115 According to the authors, the teacher
“has consented to the publication though it turns out to be
defamatory.”116 The authors did not explain this conclusion, but the
teacher arguably had reason to know that any justification the employer
might give for the firing could damage her reputation—employers do
not usually fire employees for no reason and usually at least claim to
have good cause for the firing.117 If comment d is read literally, the
112. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §   892A   cmt.   e   (“Consent   to   an   invasion   by
particular  conduct  is  not  consent  to  the  same  invasion  by  entirely  different  conduct.”).
113. E.g., id. (“Thus   one   who   consents   that   another   may   walk   across   his   land   does   not,  
without more, consent that the other may drive an automobile across it or camp on the land
while in transit, or that a third person may walk across it along with the other.”);;  id. § 892A cmt.
c  (“Thus  consent  to  a  fight  with  fists  is  not  consent  to  an  act of a very different character, such
as  biting  off  a  finger,  stabbing  with  a  knife,  or  using  brass  knuckles.”).
114. Prosser & Keeton on Torts is clear that the rule articulated in § 583 should apply
when the plaintiff has reason to believe that the defendant may say something defamatory but is
unsure exactly what the defendant will say. KEETON ET AL., supra note 101, § 114.
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 cmt. d, illus. 2.
116. Id.
117. Indeed, in the case of a schoolteacher or an employee covered under a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA), the employee is employed pursuant to an employment contract
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teacher’s consent to the publication would shield the defendant from
liability.118
Courts frequently cite this illustration as an example of a situation in
which a plaintiff has invited or procured a defamatory publication and
therefore consented to it.119 But note that there is no suggestion in the
illustration that the teacher actually knew (or even suspected) in
advance the specific reason why she was being fired. Indeed, the fact
that the teacher was “summarily discharged” and then demanded
publication of the reason for the discharge might lead one to believe that
the teacher did not know the specific reason why she had been fired or
what the employer would say. Moreover, there is no explicit mention of
the  fact  that  the  teacher  had  reason  to  believe  the  employer’s  response  
would be defamatory. Perhaps the teacher thought she was being fired
due to budgetary concerns or for some other nondefamatory reason.
Again, the teacher may arguably have had reason to know that the
response would be defamatory, but this is not entirely clear from the
sparse facts presented. Therefore, on its face, the illustration articulates
a rule under which an individual gives consent to a defamatory
publication simply by asking for an explanation of an unfavorable
decision, regardless of whether the individual had reason to believe that
the explanation itself would be unfavorable, let alone unfavorable in a
particular manner.
Finally, there is not even any suggestion in the illustration that the
employer’s stated reason was actually truthful or that the employer
believed in the accuracy of the stated reasons. Instead, according to
comment d, the teacher invited the defamatory publication by
demanding publication of the reasons for the firing.120 Therefore, she
assumed the risk not only that the publication might be defamatory but
also that the particular reason the employer gave might be false or
completely unexpected.121
that probably lists the specific reasons that justify the employer in taking adverse action against
an employee. See Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 341, 342–43, 345–47 (Mo.
1963) (applying the Restatement’s  rule  in  the  case  of  an employee covered by a CBA that listed
grounds for discipline). Therefore, an employee who is fired might have reason to know that the
employer’s  reason  for  the  discharge  will  at  least  be  one  of  the  grounds  listed  in  the contract.
118. Some courts decide these cases on the grounds that there was no publication of a
defamatory statement under these circumstances, rather than on the grounds of consent. E.g.,
Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Springfield, 447 S.W.2d 256, 268 (Mo. 1969); Beck v. Tribert, 711
A.2d 951, 959 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998). The Restatement (Second) of Torts rejects this
approach. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. e.
119. See, e.g., Charles v. State Dept. of Children and Families Dist. Nine, 914 So. 2d 1, 3
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
120. Section 583 does not specifically reference   the   concept   of   “inviting   or   procuring”   a  
defamatory publication, but it is nonetheless frequently cited in support of this concept. See,
e.g., id.
121. See supra note 101 and accompanying text; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
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2. Fair and Honest Investigations
The Restatement (Second) of Torts is also internally inconsistent on
the subject of consent in defamation cases. Comment d to § 583 notes
that, as is the case with consent in other situations, the plaintiff’s
consent is an absolute defense in a defamation action.122 Yet comment d
also notes that “one who agrees to submit his conduct to investigation
knowing that its results will be published, consents to the publication of
the honest findings of the investigators.”123 The illustration provides the
example of an investigator who “upon a fair and honest investigation”
into a particular event publishes his findings.124 Thus, not only must the
findings themselves be honest, the underlying investigation itself must
have been fair and honest. The comment’s focus on fairness and
honesty is fundamentally at odds with the idea of an absolute
privilege.125 The fact that a defendant acts in bad faith or knows that a
defamatory statement is false is irrelevant where an absolute privilege is
said to exist.126
Beyond this inconsistency, the Restatement authors’ inclusion of this
language still raises a number of questions. Did the authors really mean
to limit the existence of an absolute privilege to the publication of the
results of a fair and honest investigation, or was the inclusion of the
“fair and honest” language merely surplusage? If the inclusion of the
TORTS § 583 cmt. d (stating that one who agrees to a publication under such circumstances
“takes  the  risk  that  it  may  be  defamatory”).  Admittedly,  this  is  not  the  only  interpretation  of  the  
comment and illustration. Most public school teachers are employed pursuant to an employment
contract that probably lists the specific reasons why the employer may fire the teacher. See
Williams, 447  S.W.2d  at  259  (noting  reasons  for  discharge  listed  in  employee’s  contract).  The  
same might be true for any employee who is employed pursuant to an employment contract or
CBA. See Hellesen, 370 S.W.2d at 342–43, 345–47 (applying the Restatement’s  rule  in  the  case  
of an employee covered by a CBA that listed grounds for discipline). Therefore, an employee
employed pursuant to such a contract might have reason to know  that  the  employer’s  reason  for  
the discharge will at least be one of the grounds listed in the contract. Perhaps the authors of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts expected readers to understand this fact. Perhaps the authors also
expected readers to presume that the rule stated in comment b only applies when the plaintiff
has reason to know of the specific nature of the defamatory comment. If so, the authors expected
a great deal from readers.
122. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. f.
123. Id. § 892A cmt. d (emphasis added).
124. Id. § 892A cmt. d, illus. 3.
125. Baker v. Lafayette Coll., 504 A.2d 247, 250 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (stating that the
application  of  comment  d’s  fairness  and  honesty  limit “would  have  the  effect  of  converting  the  
consent privilege from an absolute privilege to a conditional one”), aff’d, 532 A.2d 399 (Pa.
1987).
126. See Correllas v. Viveiros, 572 N.E.2d 7, 10 (Mass. 1991) (stating that the presence of
malice or bad faith does not defeat an absolute privilege); Matthis v. Kennedy, 67 N.W.2d 413,
416 (Minn. 1954) (stating that even intentionally false statements do not defeat an absolute
privilege); see also Horkan, supra note 73, at 532 (noting the conflict in the Restatement’s  
language).
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“fair and honest” language was purposeful, did the authors intend to
limit the scope of their rule solely to the investigation situation? If so,
why is the “fair and honest” condition precedent so limited? Why does
the same rule not apply to any situation in which the defendant provides
information for use by a third person? It certainly seems reasonable to
conclude that an individual who consents to the publication of the
results of an investigation should not be barred from recovering where
the investigation turns out to have been unfair or dishonest. But why
shouldn’t the same rule apply whenever an individual consents to the
release of any information that is later established to have been
published by the defendant in bad faith or with knowledge of its falsity?
The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts offered no answer
to these questions or to the more general question of why they adopted a
standard for consent in the defamation context so seemingly at odds
with the rest of the corpus of tort law.
III. THE ROLE OF CONSENT IN EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE CASES
Many courts have relied upon § 583 when dealing with issues of
consent concerning defamatory publications. However, there is
considerable divergence among courts regarding how to apply the rule
outlined in § 583. The following Part examines some of the special
problems posed by the consent defense in the employment reference
context.
A. Section  583’s  Application in the Typical Employment
Reference Case
On its face, comment d to § 583 appears to change the standard rules
regarding the consent defense in terms of the expectations of the party
giving consent. At a minimum, the comment contains ambiguity. Courts
have taken several approaches when dealing with situations covered by
this comment.
1. Decisions Concluding that Consent to Publication Equals
Consent to Defamation
While citing § 583, some courts pay virtually no attention to the
question of whether the plaintiff had reason to believe that an
employment reference would be defamatory. Instead, these courts
simply observe that when an employee consents to the release of
information concerning  the  employee’s  job performance, the responding
employer enjoys an absolute privilege in a subsequent defamation
action.127 As a result, there is no inquiry into the question of what
127. See Cox v. Nasche, 70 F.3d 1030, 1031 (9th Cir. 1995) (involving a signed release);
Patane v. Broadmoor Hotel, Inc., 708 P.2d 473, 474, 476 (Colo. App. 1985) (involving
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information the employee reasonably believed might be disclosed.
Instead, an employee’s consent to the publication of information about
her job history is necessarily consent to the publication of any
defamatory statements, thereby barring the plaintiff’s claim. As a result,
these decisions establish a standard that is even broader than that
contained in § 583.
Gengler v. Phelps,128 a New Mexico case, is typical of these types of
decisions. In Gengler, the plaintiff, a nurse, was told that her
employment would be terminated soon. In the interim, the plaintiff
applied for a job. The application form asked when the prospective
employer could contact the plaintiff’s current employer for a reference.
The plaintiff replied “anytime.”129 When contacted by the prospective
employer, a doctor at the plaintiff’s workplace commented that the
plaintiff lacked professional competence. The plaintiff was not hired for
the new position and sued her employer based on the negative
reference.130 The court made quick work of the plaintiff’s defamation
claim. By indicating on the job application that the prospective
employer could contact her current employer, the court concluded that
the plaintiff had consented to the negative reference that followed.131
The court then cited § 583 for the principle that consent is an absolute
defense in a defamation action.132 The court reasoned that because
“Plaintiff knew, when she signed the application, that Veterans
Administration personnel would ask her former employer about her
work record,” she had consented to the publication.133
This is the sum and substance of the court’s opinion. By indicating
on the application form that the prospective employer could contact her
present employer, the employee had consented to the ensuing
defamatory publication and was therefore barred from recovery. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts explains that even when an individual
signed a release provided by the defendant, the court should not infer
lightly that the individual intended to release the defendant from all
forms of liability for intentional wrongdoing.134 Yet in Gengler, the
authorization form the plaintiff signed failed to mention anything about
releasing responding employers from liability, let alone liability for
defamation. The only thing the plaintiff expressly agreed to was
allowing the prospective employer to immediately contact her current
allegation that plaintiff was a thief).
128. 589 P.2d 1056 (N.M. Ct. App. 1978).
129. Id. at 1057.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1058.
132. Id. at 1057.
133. Id. at 1058.
134. See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text.
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employer. The court also did not consider whether the employee knew
or had any reason to know that the responding doctor would question
her competence. Indeed, it did not consider whether the plaintiff had
any reason to know that a response would contain any type of
defamatory statement, let alone that particular statement. Of course, it is
entirely possible that the plaintiff had strong reason to suspect that the
responding doctor would say exactly what he said. But the court never
considered this relevant point of inquiry. Instead, by simply indicating
that the prospective employer could contact her present employer, the
plaintiff had waived any ability to succeed on a defamation claim
according to the court.
Some courts have adopted a similar approach in cases in which
employees had signed written releases. In Woodfield v. Providence
Hospital,135 the plaintiff signed a form when she applied for a new job,
releasing from liability any employers who provided information about
her work record.136 When the prospective employer contacted the
plaintiff’s former employer, a former supervisor informed the
prospective employer that the plaintiff had not received a promotion due
to her poor performance.137 In fact, the plaintiff had never applied for a
promotion, thus making the supervisor’s statement potentially
misleading. Nor had the plaintiff ever been disciplined or reprimanded.
Moreover, when the plaintiff first began work for her former employer,
she was given an employee manual that specifically advised employees
that the employer would only release employment dates and the title of
the last position held.138 These facts suggest that the plaintiff was
justified in assuming that her former employer would not make
defamatory statements about her prior work history. However, the
opinion from the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals never mentions any of
this in its reasoning. Instead, the court quickly concluded that the
release   was   valid   and   therefore   acted   as   consent   to   bar   the   plaintiff’s  
defamation claim.139
In contrast, some courts have adopted an approach more consistent
with § 583. In this approach, there is at least some inquiry into whether
the plaintiff had reason to know that a reference might be defamatory.140
135. 779 A.2d 933 (D.C. 2001).
136. Id. at 936.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 935.
139. Id. at 938.
140. See, e.g., Fuhrman v. EDS Nanston, Inc., 483 S.E.2d 648, 649 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997)
(“Plaintiff’s   argument  that  she  was  entitled  to  expect  any  statement to a potential employer to
reflect the high rating she received in a formal evaluation only a few weeks prior to her
termination is disingenuous in view of the wealth of evidence as to the events which had
transpired afterwards, culminating in her termination.”);;   Eitler   v.   St.   Joseph   Reg’l   Med.   Ctr.  
South-Bend Campus, Inc., 789 N.E.2d 497, 501 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (citing § 583 and
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However, also consistent with § 583, there is little to no inquiry into
whether the plaintiff had reason to know that the resulting reference
would contain the particular defamatory statements it did or statements
that were substantially similar. It is enough in these cases that the
plaintiff had reason to know that a reference would be negative as a
general matter.141
Still other courts tend to apply the more traditional consent rules and,
in contrast with § 583, thus inquire into whether an employee had
reason to believe that a reference might be defamatory in a particular
manner or in a substantially similar manner.142 Thus, when an employee
is told why he is being fired and the employer then repeats those reasons
to a prospective  employer,  the  employee’s consent to the release of any
information concerning his former employment is effective, even if the
employee disputes the accuracy of the underlying facts.143 When,
however, an employee is only aware of a former employer’s general
unhappiness with the employee’s job performance but is unaware of any
specific concerns or suspicions the employer may have that are later
repeated to another, some courts have concluded that the employee has
not necessarily consented to the defamatory publication.144
concluding that plaintiff had reason to know that former   supervisor’s   reference   would   be  
negative in light of the plaintiff’s  past  conflicts  with  her supervisor).
141. Fuhrman, 483 S.E.2d at 649; Eitler, 789 N.E.2d at 501.
142. See, e.g., Litman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1549, 1555, 1560
(11th Cir. 1984) (concluding that the plaintiff had reason to know that his former employer
would make defamatory statements about the plaintiff’s   business   practices   in   light   of   the   fact  
that the former employer had told the plaintiff upon firing that the plaintiff   had   “very serious
financial  problems”);;  Oliphint  v.  Richards,  167 S.W.3d 513, 516 (Tex. App. 2005) (concluding
that the plaintiff had reason to expect his former employer would contradict his version of his
separation from employment because the plaintiff knew employer had already done so with
another prospective employer).
143. See Bagwell   v.   Peninsula   Reg’l   Med. Ctr., 665 A.2d 297, 305, 316 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1995) (involving an employee who was provided a written statement explaining the reason
for his discharge); see also Harrell  v.  City  of  Gastonia,  392  Fed.  App’x 197, 201, 207 (4th Cir.
2010) (involving an employee   who   agreed   to   release   of   “all   information”   concerning   his  
employment, knowing that his personnel file contained the negative memorandum that was
provided to the prospective employer).
144. See, e.g., Exxon Corp., USA v. Schoene, 508 A.2d 142, 147 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1986) (rejecting a consent defense where employer had expressed unhappiness about cash
shortages but had never accused the employee of theft); see also McDermott v. Hughley, 561
A.2d 1038, 1046 (Md. 1989) (concluding that a jury question on the consent issue existed where
a supervisor told his employee that he believed the employee’s  medical  condition  was  real  but  
then later told another he believed the employee was faking); Free v. Am. Home Assurance Co.,
902 S.W.2d 51, 54–55 (Tex. App. 1995) (concluding that a jury question existed where plaintiff
had resigned after a disagreement with his former supervisor). Interestingly, at least one
decision has questioned whether the plaintiff had reason to know that individuals who were
known to harbor negative feelings toward the plaintiff would answer a request for information.
Marcoux-Norton v. Kmart Corp., 907 F. Supp. 766, 781 (D. Vt. 1993).
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For example, Hypothetical 1 in the Introduction is based on Frank B.
Hall & Co., Inc. v. Buck, a Texas case.145 There, the employee was told
that he was being fired because he had failed to generate sufficient
business, a fact he disputed.146 Later, when contacted by a prospective
employer,147 the former employer launched into a string of defamatory
statements, including calling the employee “a zero” and “a Jekyll and
Hyde person” who had padded his expense accounts.148 A Texas
appellate court upheld a jury verdict in the employee’s favor,
concluding that the jury was entitled to conclude that the employee
lacked sufficient knowledge concerning what the employer would say to
a subsequent employer.149
2. Decisions Adopting a Broad Conception of When an
Employee Has Reason to Know that a Reference May Be
Defamatory
In keeping with the general view concerning consent, some courts
have been willing to conclude that it is ordinarily for the jury to decide
whether a plaintiff had reason to believe a former employer would
defame the plaintiff when the employee consented to a publication.150
However, some courts are quick to conclude as a matter of law that an
employee had reason to know that the publication might be defamatory.
The leading case in this respect is Smith v. Holley,151 another Texas
case.
In Holley, the employee in question, a police officer, had received
negative performance evaluations. Ultimately, the city’s chief of police,
Smith, informed Holley that her employment would be terminated.
Holley challenged the contents of one of the evaluations and appealed
the firing decision.152 Rather than firing Holley, the city entered into an
agreement with her, under which she could resign instead of being
145. 678 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. App. 1984).
146. Id. at 618.
147. Actually,  the  “prospective  employer”   was  an  investigator  hired  by  the  plaintiff  in  an  
effort to determine what the former employer was telling prospective employers when the
plaintiff applied for jobs. Id. at 617.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 617–18. The court actually seemed to be applying a knowledge standard, rather
than  a  “reason  to  know”  standard.   See id.; see also Ramos v. Henry C. Beck Co., 711 S.W.2d
331, 336 (Tex. App. 1986) (stating that the plaintiff must have known the defendant would
defame him before he could be deemed to have consented).
150. See, e.g., Free, 902 S.W.2d at 54–55 (reversing summary judgment for the employer
on the consent issue where the plaintiff and his former supervisor who subsequently defamed
the plaintiff  had  previously   gotten  into  “a  squabble”);;   Ramos, 711 S.W.2d at 336 (concluding
that a jury question existed as to whether the plaintiff knew his employer would defame him
when the plaintiff asked why he was being fired).
151. 827 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App. 1992).
152. Id. at 435.
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fired.153 In exchange, the city was to “purge from its personnel records
all references to the involuntary termination, and would mark each page
of her personnel file with a notice limiting the information available to
anyone asking about Holley’s employment record.”154 Specifically, the
notice instructed a reader that anyone inquiring about Holley’s
employment history was to be told the dates of her employment, that
she had resigned voluntarily, and that company policy prohibited the
disclosure of any additional information. The notice concluded by
warning a reader (in all caps and italics) that “ABSOLUTELY
NOTHING BUT THE ABOVE INFORMATION WILL BE
RELEASED TO ANYONE BY ANYBODY.”155 The agreement itself
repeated the point (again, in italics) that this was to be “the only
information” provided to a prospective employer “either officially or
unofficially by anyone connected” with the employer.156
When Holley applied for a new job, she signed a release authorizing
former employers and others to release information concerning her
employment to the prospective employer and releasing these individuals
from any and all liability. 157 Despite Holley’s agreement with the city
prohibiting the release of information, Smith, the chief of police,
provided detailed and damaging information about Holley’s
employment.158 This information included documents from Holley’s
personnel file, to which Smith still had access. As a result, Holley was
not hired for the new position. She successfully sued the chief on a
defamation theory.159
On appeal, a Texas appellate court held that the release signed by
Holley when she applied for the new job immunized the defendant from
liability on the grounds of consent.160 In assessing the plaintiff’s claim,
the court noted that comment d to § 583 of the Restatement (Second) of
Torts provides that consent serves as a defense when the plaintiff has
reason to know that the publication might be defamatory.161 Here, the
court reasoned, Holley had reason to know that someone at the police
department might make defamatory statements about her “because it is
undisputed that she knew that Smith and others at the Big Spring Police
Department held unfavorable opinions about her performance there.”162
According to the court, the fact that Holley had bargained to limit the
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 435 n.3.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 435–36.
Id. at 436.
Id.
Id. at 440.
Id.
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information that could be disclosed was of no import because Smith was
not a party to that agreement and because the subsequent release signed
by Holley unambiguously authorized the disclosure of information.163
The fact that the city had promised, as part of a binding contract,164
not to disclose the negative information makes the case particularly
interesting. Several employer reference statutes contemplate this
scenario and specifically provide that an employer who provides a
reference in violation of the type of nondisclosure agreement at issue in
Holley cannot claim the statutory privilege that would normally
apply.165 The employee in Holley obviously consented to the release of
information knowing that Smith had negative views toward her and that
there was negative information in her personnel files; however, she
consented with the knowledge that the former employer was
contractually obligated not to disclose this information and to make
clear to its employees that they were not to discuss her employment
with a prospective employer. Holly bargained for this concession from
the former employer with this kind of scenario in mind, knowing full
well that someday a prospective employer would ask the city for a
reference. Therefore, it seems odd for a court to conclude as a matter of
law that the plaintiff was not justified in believing that any disclosure to
prospective employers would be limited to the terms of the agreement.
It seems especially odd in light of the fact that Smith, the police chief
who provided the information, was at the center of the initial dispute
and was undoubtedly aware of the nondisclosure agreement and the
circumstances surrounding it.
For employees, the takeaway from Holley is fairly daunting. If an
employee knows that there is anyone remaining at a former place of
employment who harbors ill-will toward the employee and who may be
contacted by a prospective employer, the employee has reason to know,
for purposes of the consent analysis, that the individual may defame her.
This is true despite the existence of any preexisting contract prohibiting
the release of such information. It is also true despite the generally
applicable rule in other situations that a broadly worded release should
not prohibit liability unless it is clear that the plaintiff clearly intended
to allow the wrongful conduct and to release the defendant from
liability.166

163. Id.
164. In addition to the defamation claim against Smith, Holley also sued the city for breach
of contract. Id. at 436.
165. E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 60-4-12(2) (West, Westlaw through 2014 Reg. Sess. and Sup. Ct. R. 13-12).
166. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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B. Invited or Procured Defamation
An employee’s consent may also bar a defamation claim when a
court concludes that the employee invited or procured the defamatory
publication. This may occur in several ways. First, consistent with an
illustration contained in § 583, an employee may “invite” a defamatory
publication by inquiring, in the presence of others, why the employee
was fired.167
An example of this scenario is seen in Charles v. State Department
of Children and Families District Nine,168 the facts of which loosely
form the basis of Hypothetical 2 in the Introduction. They are also
strikingly similar to the illustration in § 583 involving the teacher who
is summarily discharged.169 The plaintiff in Charles was told that his
employment was being terminated. When he attended the formal
dismissal meeting, he asked, in the presence of others, why he was
being fired. A human resources employee informed the plaintiff that he
was being fired due to his “criminal lifestyle.”170 The plaintiff sued,
alleging that the speaker knew the statement was false and acted
maliciously or with an improper purpose.171
Citing § 583, the court concluded that the plaintiff had invited the
defamatory statement by asking for the reason for his termination.172
Accordingly, his defamation claim failed.173 Since the plaintiff was
being fired, one could argue that he had reason to know that any reason
given for his firing could have been defamatory. However, unless the
plaintiff did actually lead a criminal lifestyle or knew that his employer
believed he led a criminal lifestyle, it is hard to see how he had any
reason to think that the employer would state that reason for his firing.
But, as is the case with the illustration in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts involving the teacher who demands an explanation for why she
has been fired, all of that is irrelevant under the court’s analysis.174 All
that mattered to the court is that the plaintiff asked the question, thereby
consenting to whatever defamatory response the speaker might give.
Charles is not, strictly speaking, an employment reference case.175
167. See supra note 117 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Johnson v. City of Buckner, 610
S.W.2d 406, 408, 411 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (involving employee who asked why he was being
fired).
168. 914 So. 2d 1, 3 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
169. See supra notes 115–116 and accompanying text.
170. Charles, 914 So. 2d at 2.
171. Id. at 1–2.
172. Id. at 3.
173. Id. at 1, 3.
174. The Charles court actually referenced this illustration and some of the relevant cases.
Id. at 3.
175. Similarly, courts have also referenced the invited defamation rule when an employee
files an internal grievance concerning an adverse employment action and the employer makes a
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However, the case has implications for the reference scenario. At some
point, an employee who applies for a new job may be required to tell the
prospective employer why she was fired. At this point, the employee
has to choose between lying—knowing full well that the prospective
employer may contact the former employer to confirm the employee’s
story—and revealing the former employer’s stated reasons and trying to
explain the employee’s side of the story.176 The general rule is that an
employee who “self-publishes” the defamatory statements under these
circumstances may not recover on a defamation claim.177 Thus, if the
employee gives a truthful response and is not hired, the employee could
not recover against the employer for making the defamatory statement
in the first instance, nor could he recover when he was not hired for
repeating the defamatory statement.
The “invited or procured” scenario may arise in other ways. In some
instances, courts have invoked the “invited or procured”   idea   in   the  
typical employment reference scenario when an employee authorizes a
prospective employer to contact a former employer.178 More commonly,
courts have invoked the rule when an employee has employed a friend
or other agent to contact a former employer and pose as a prospective
employer in an attempt to determine what the employer would say (or
perhaps has been saying) to prospective employers.179 In these
situations, courts often conclude that there can be no recovery since the
defamatory statement about the employee to a union representative acting on behalf of the
employee. E.g., Peterson v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 349 F.2d 934, 935–36, 938 (9th
Cir. 1965); Brockman v. Detroit Diesel Allison Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 366 N.E.2d 1201,
1202, 1204–05 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
176. See Lewis   v.   Equitable   Life   Assurance   Soc’y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 888 (Minn. 1986)
(discussing the choice employees face in this scenario); Markita D. Cooper, Between a Rock and
a Hard Place: Time for a New Doctrine of Compelled Self-Publication, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
373, 431 (1997) (explaining that an applicant in this situation could either lie or attempt to
explain what happened).
177. See Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chem. Co., 837 A.2d 759, 764–65 (Conn. 2003) (“‘[M]ost
jurisdictions have yet to recognize compelled self-publication defamation or have expressly
rejected it.’”  (quoting Cweklinsky v. Mobil Chem. Co., 297 F.3d 154, 159 (2d Cir. 2002))).
178. E.g., Litman v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 739 F.2d 1549, 1560 (11th Cir.
1984).
179. E.g., Kelewae v. Jim Meagher Chevrolet, Inc., 952 F.2d 1052, 1055 (8th Cir. 1992)
(applying Missouri law); Martinez v. New England Med. Ctr. Hosps., Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 257,
269 (D. Mass. 2004) (applying Massachusetts law); Burns v. Barry, 228 N.E.2d 728, 731 (Mass.
1967); Beck v. Tribert, 711 A.2d 951, 959 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998); Frank B. Hall &
Co., Inc. v. Buck, 678 S.W.2d 612, 617 (Tex. App. 1984); see also Eggleston v. Klemp, No. CV
06-218-N-EJL, 2007 WL 1468686, at *2, *3 (D. Idaho May 18, 2007) (involving defamation
claim brought against business competitor stemming from defamatory statements made to the
plaintiffs’   agents   posing as potential patients), aff’d, 295 Fed. App’x 233 (9th Cir. 2008);
LeBreton v. Weiss, 680 N.Y.S.2d 532, 532 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (involving a defamation
claim brought against a former landlord stemming from defamatory statements that the landlord
made to the plaintiff’s  agents  posing  as  potential  landlords).
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employee invited or procured the resulting defamatory publication.180
But, again, there is typically no analysis in these cases as to the question
of whether the employee knew or had reason to know in advance the
particular nature of the employer’s defamatory publication.181 Instead,
the mere fact that the employee’s agent contacted the employer posing
as a prospective employer is enough to defeat the claim.182
C. “Fair  and  Honest”  Investigations  into  an  Employee’s  
Background
Courts have also been called upon to determine the extent to which
an individual who agrees to submit his conduct to investigation consents
to any resulting  defamatory  publication  of  the  investigator’s  findings.  In  
addressing this issue, courts have had to interpret § 583’s   internally  
inconsistent observation that an absolute privilege applies in these cases
except when the investigation is dishonest or conducted in bad faith, or
the findings of the investigation are dishonest.183 This issue has arisen in
numerous contexts, such as the tenure evaluation process,184 when an
employer conducts a performance evaluation of an employee, 185 and as
180. See, e.g., Kelewae, 952 F.2d at 1055; Martinez, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 269.
181. See, e.g., Kelewae, 952 F.2d at 1055; Martinez, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 269. It bears
emphasizing that it is entirely possible that some of the plaintiffs in these scenarios may have
known with reasonable certainty or suspected what the employer would say in response to an
inquiry. In Kelawae, for example, the employee had been fired for poor performance and this
was   the   reason   the   employer   gave   to   the   employee’s   agents   posing   as   prospective   employers.  
952 F.2d at 1054. The point is that courts typically do not even make this inquiry once they
conclude that the plaintiff invited the employer to respond to the inquiry.
182. In   the   “invited   or   procured”   cases, it is not always clear on what bases the courts
denied recovery. See Hellesen v. Knaus Truck Lines, Inc., 370 S.W.2d 341, 345–46 (Mo. 1963)
(citing the Restatement’s   consent   rule   but   also   stating   that   there   is   no   publication   when   the
plaintiff or his agent invited or procured the defamatory publication). In some cases, courts
appear to have used consent to justify denying recovery. Peterson v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 349 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1965); Frank B. Hall & Co., 678 S.W.2d at 617–18; LeBreton,
680 N.Y.S.2d at 532. Some decisions are based on the idea that there had been no publication to
a third party. Beck, 711 A.2d at 959. In others, courts stated that the defamatory publication was
privileged, see Martinez, 307 F. Supp. 2d at 269, though some limited the privilege to a
qualified privilege. See Burns, 228 N.E.2d at 731 (stating that such publications are privileged
provided no actual malice is shown). In others, the courts seemed to adopt a general rule that
one who invites or procures a defamatory publication may not recover. See Kelewae, 952 F.2d at
1055. The historical treatment of these kinds of cases is discussed infra in Section IV.A.
183. See supra notes 123–124 and accompanying text.
184. E.g., Bloch v. Temple Univ., 939 F. Supp. 387, 389, 391, 397 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Lester
v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 67 (Me. 1991); see also Johnson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1070,
1071, 1073–74 (8th Cir. 1996) (involving defamatory statements made as part of a medical
residency program); Kraft v. William Alanson White Psychiatric Found., 498 A.2d 1145, 1149–
50 (D.C. 1985) (involving defamatory statements made as part of a post-graduate education
program).
185. E.g., Farrington  v.  Bureau  of  Nat’l  Affairs,  596  A.2d 58, 58–59 (D.C. 1991).
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part of an employer’s   internal   grievance   procedure.186 However, the
issue has also arisen in the reference context.
Hypothetical 3 in the Introduction is loosely based on Cruz v.
Behnke,187 a decision from a Connecticut federal court. In Cruz, the
plaintiff applied for a managerial position and, during the application
process, authorized the employer to conduct a criminal background
check. The employer hired a third party, BTi (now known as
ChoicePoint), to conduct the investigation. BTi mistakenly informed
the employer that the plaintiff had been convicted of two felonies,
which caused a supervisor for the employer to repeat this
misinformation in front of others.188 The court rejected the argument
that by authorizing the investigation into his background the plaintiff
had consented to the defamatory publication that resulted. The court
explained, “Although [the plaintiff] consented to dissemination and
discussion of his criminal history within appropriate limits, he did not
consent to the dissemination of indisputably inaccurate information to
the public.”189
Cruz is   unusual   in   its   decision   that   the   plaintiff’s   consent   to   an  
investigation did not constitute an absolute bar to a defamation claim.
Most   courts   have   concluded   that   the   plaintiff’s   consent   to   an  
investigation or evaluation imposes an absolute bar to recovery.190 Thus,
the fact that an investigation was performed in a slipshod or dishonest
manner or contained knowingly false statements of fact would be
irrelevant. Some of these courts have expressly cited comment d and its
illustration to support their conclusions.191 Like Cruz, a few courts have
186. E.g., Mandelblatt v. Perelman, 683 F. Supp. 379, 380–82, 383–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
Ernst v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 475 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985); Rouch v. Continental
Airlines, Inc., 70 S.W.3d 170, 172–73 (Tex. App. 2001). The issue has also arisen under facts
like those presented in § 583’s  illustrations, where an individual is a member of an organization
and, as part of the terms of membership, agrees to submit his conduct to an investigation by the
organization. Rosenberg v. Am. Bowling Cong., 589 F. Supp. 547, 551–52 (M.D. Fla. 1984).
187. No. 3:04CV1119 (DJS), 2006 WL 860104 (D. Conn. Mar. 31, 2006).
188. Id. at *1.
189. Id. at   *2  n.1.  Interestingly,  the  court  did  not  reference  §  583’s  rule  to  the  effect  that  
one who publishes the honest results of an investigation in these circumstances enjoys a
privilege. However, on its face, comment d to § 583  might  have  applied.  The  words  “fair”  and  
“honest”  might  imply  the  existence  of  a  good-faith belief in the factual accuracy of a statement.
Thus, it is possible that BTi and the employer were mistaken about the facts associated with the
investigation, but their mistake was an honest one. However, by inquiring into the honesty of a
defendant, courts would potentially be limiting the reach of the consent defense and—at least in
this type of scenario—transforming consent from an absolute privilege into a conditional one.
See supra notes 126–27 and accompanying text.
190. E.g., Johnson v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 97 F.3d 1070, 1074 (8th Cir. 1996); Bloch v.
Temple Univ., 939 F. Supp. 387, 397 (E.D. Pa. 1996); Rosenberg, 589 F. Supp. at 552;
Farrington, 596 A.2d at 59–60; Kraft v. William Alanson White Psychiatric Found., 498 A.2d
1145, 1150 (D.C. 1985); Ernst, 475 N.E.2d at 355; Rouch, 70 S.W.3d at 173.
191. E.g., Rosenberg, 589 F. Supp. at 552; see, e.g., Rouch, 70 S.W.3d at 173.
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been unwilling to assume that an individual impliedly consented to the
publication of all types of defamatory material following an
investigation or evaluation absent a clear indication of such intent.192
Interestingly, at least one decision has cited § 583 in support of its
conclusion that a qualified, rather than absolute, privilege applies in
these situations.193
IV. SEEKING JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE DIFFERENT TREATMENT OF
CONSENT IN DEFAMATION AND EMPLOYMENT REFERENCE CASES
As the foregoing illustrates, defamation law is at odds with the rest
of tort law in terms of its treatment of consent. Some courts are quick to
find that an individual’s mere consent to an investigation or the
disclosure of information is a bar to a subsequent defamation claim, no
matter the nature of the defamatory publication at issue. Even those
courts that apply § 583 according to its terms are applying a test that
takes a far more expansive approach to the concept of consent than the
rest of tort law. All of this is at odds with traditional tort law, which
typically presumes the absence of consent when the defendant invades
the rights of another.194 These differences are only highlighted in the
specific case of defamation claims stemming from an employment
reference. The question then becomes whether there is something
special enough about defamation claims or employment reference
cases—in terms of either the historical development of the law in these
areas or the policy values implicated—that justifies this approach.
A. The Historical Origins of § 583
Section 583 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts and its comments
repeat virtually verbatim the same section and comments from the first
Restatement of Torts.195 The Reporter’s Note accompanying § 583 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts first lists seventeen decisions that
supposedly support the rule contained in the section. To put it mildly,
this is something of an overstatement. Some of the decisions cited
provide limited support for some of the rules contained in the main

192. See, e.g., Mandelblatt v. Perelman, 683 F. Supp. 379, 383–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); Lester
v. Powers, 596 A.2d 65, 69 (Me. 1991); see also Wallace v. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher &
Flom, 715 A.2d 873, 881–82 (D.C. 1998) (stating that in the absence of a contract or of some
affirmative  act  of  consent,  the  defendants’  allegedly  defamatory  communications  were  protected  
by a qualified privilege only).
193. Mandelblatt, 683 F. Supp. at 383.
194. See Bell, supra note 48,   at   35   (“Absent   an   expression   to   the   contrary,   tort   law  
typically assumes that the violation of a right—such as battery of a person or conversion of
goods—evokes the victim’s unconsent.” (footnote omitted)).
195. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 583 (1938).
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section and its comments.196 However, others provide little, if any,
support for those rules. Some of decisions cited actually contradict those
rules.
1. Section 583’s “Reason to Know” Standard
First, none of the cases cited provide much, if any, support for the
notion that a plaintiff need not appreciate the risk that a publication will
be defamatory in a particular manner or even in general for consent to
be effective, provided the plaintiff had reason to know that the
publication might be defamatory. In several of the cited decisions, the
plaintiffs actually knew in advance what the substance of the
defamatory publication would be.197 But none of the decisions reference
a “reason to know” standard. In a few of the decisions cited, the
plaintiffs might have had reason to know in advance that the defendant
would defame them.198 However, none of the decisions even mention
this fact, let alone rely upon it as a basis for their reasoning.
The case cited that is closest to being on point is Borden, Inc. v.
Wallace,199 a Texas case in which an employee consented to the
administration of a polygraph test based on the employer’s suspicions of
theft and misconduct. The court observed that, in consenting to the
polygraph, the employee “must have known” that the employer would
tell the operator of the polygraph the reasons why the employee was
taking the test; thus, the employee consented to the defamatory
publication.200 Obviously, a “must have known” standard is quite
different than a “reason to know” standard. Moreover, given the
circumstances, the employee in this case must have known the exact
nature of the anticipated defamatory publication, not simply the fact that
196. For example, the authors cited Connors v. Collier, 119 N.Y.S. 513, 515 (N.Y. Spec.
Term 1909), a decision that concluded that  the  plaintiff’s  consent  to  a  defamatory  publication is
an absolute defense. The text of § 583 repeats this rule. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583
(1976). But, beyond this, the decision has little relevance for the rules stated in the comments.
The authors also cited Louisville Times Co. v. Lancaster, 133 S.W. 1155, 1156, 1158 (Ky.
1911), a case in which the plaintiff released one defendant from liability for a defamatory
publication appearing in a newspaper as part of a retraction of an earlier story. Like Connors,
the case is relevant for the idea that   a   plaintiff’s   consent   renders   a   defamatory   publication  
absolutely privileged, but little else.
197. See, e.g., Joftes v. Kaufman, 324 F. Supp. 660, 661 (D.D.C. 1971); DeLuca v. Reader,
323 A.2d 309, 311 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1974).
198. Several of the cited cases involve situations in which an employee was fired and
sought to determine the reasons for the firing. See, e.g., Beeler v. Jackson, 2 A. 916, 916–17
(Md. 1886); Christopher v. Akin, 101 N.E. 971, 971 (Mass. 1913). The employees, by virtue of
the fact that they had been fired, might have had reason to know that any statements made by
the employer as to the reasons for the firing would be defamatory, even if the employees did not
know what the stated reasons would be.
199. 570 S.W.2d 445 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
200. Id. at 448.
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any statements to the operator would be defamatory in general.
Finally, Borden, Inc. was decided in 1978, well after the original
Restatement articulated the “reason to know” standard. If other
defamation decisions decided prior to the publication of the original
Restatement relied upon a “reason to know” standard, those decisions
appeared only infrequently at best. Instead, the idea that a plaintiff can
give effective consent to a defamatory publication without knowing in
advance the particular nature of the publication only began to appear
regularly in the decisional law after the original Restatement and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts announced this to be the rule. In many of
those decisions, the courts actually cite § 583 in support of that
statement of the law.201 It is perhaps overly harsh to suggest that the
authors of the Restatement created the “reason to know” rule out of
whole cloth. But there is little evidence that the authors of the original
Restatement were actually restating the law when they announced the
“reason to know” standard.
2. Invited or Procured Defamation
There is some support in the pre-Restatement case law for the
general idea stated in comment d to § 583 that one cannot recover when
one has invited or procured a defamatory publication. However, with
§ 583 , the authors of the Restatements took an area of the law in which
there was already disagreement and completely recharacterized it,
thereby creating more confusion.
Prior to the publication of § 583 of the original Restatement in 1938,
there were numerous statements of the law to the effect that a
defamatory publication that was procured or invited by the defendant is
not actionable.202 In some of the cases the plaintiff demanded, in the
201. See, e.g., Christensen v. Marvin, 539 P.2d 1082, 1083–84 (Or. 1975) (en banc); Baker
v. Lafayette Coll., 504 A.2d 247, 268 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
202. E.g., Shinglemeyer v. Wright, 82 N.W. 887, 891 (Mich. 1900) (concluding that there
was no remedy for defamation where the plaintiff solicited the defamatory statement in the
presence of another); Irish-Am. Bank v. Bader, 61 N.W. 328, 328 (Minn. 1894) (concluding that
a defamatory statement induced by the plaintiff is not actionable); Ely v. Borck, 39 Ohio C.C.
277,   278   (Ohio   Ct.   App.   1916)   (stating   that   “the   great   preponderance   of   authority,   as   well   as  
reason, is in favor of the proposition that an action of slander will not lie [when it has been
invited   or   procured   by   the   plaintiff]”);; 17 RULING CASE LAW § 61, at 320 (William M.
McKinney  &  Burdett  A.  Rich  eds.,  1917)  (“It  is  generally  held  that  the  publication  of  a  libel  or  
slander invited or procured by the plaintiff is not sufficient to support an action for
defamation.”).  There  were  also numerous statements to the effect that a defamatory publication
invited or procured by the plaintiff in an attempt to manufacture a defamation claim is not
actionable. See, e.g., Howland v. George F. Blake Mfg. Co., 31 N.E. 656, 658 (Mass. 1892);
Nott v. Stoddard, 38 Vt. 25, 31 (1865). The authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts
actually cited several of these decisions—for example, Richardson v. Gunby, 127 P. 533, 536
(Kan. 1912) and Howland, 31 N.E. at 658—but recharacterized them as standing for the
proposition  that  “[t]he  plaintiff’s  consent  is  a  defense  even  though  he  procures  the publication
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presence of others, that the defendant explain why the plaintiff had been
fired,203 or otherwise demanded that the defendant repeat a previous
defamatory statement.204 In others, the plaintiff enlisted a third party to
inquire of an employer why the plaintiff had been fired,205 to persuade
the employer to reconsider the decision or assist the plaintiff in
challenging an adverse decision,206 or to provide support as the plaintiff
confronted the defendant about some matter.207
These cases were typically decided on one of two grounds. First,
some courts held that there was no publication to begin with in these
kinds of situations.208 To make out a prima facie case of defamation, a
plaintiff must establish that there was a publication of defamatory
material to at least one person other than the plaintiff.209 The decisions
taking the position that there had been no publication under these
circumstances reasoned that when the plaintiff himself invited or
demanded an explanation, the plaintiff had, for all intents and purposes,
made the publication himself.210 When the defendant made the
defamatory statement to, or in the presence of, a third party enlisted by
the plaintiff, these courts treated the third party as an agent or alter ego
of the plaintiff and reasoned that there was no publication to a third
party.211 Thus, some courts treated these situations as involving selfpublication, which typically does not satisfy the publication
for   the   purpose   of   decoying   the   defendant   into   a   lawsuit.”   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 583  Reporter’s  Note (1977).
203. E.g., Beeler, 2 A. at 917; Christopher, 101 N.E. at 971, 972.
204. E.g., Shinglemeyer, 82 N.W. at 890; see also Haynes v. Leland, 29 Me. 233, 233–34
(1848) (involving lawyer who, on behalf of his client, invited an individual  to  lawyer’s  office  
and had the individual repeat a defamatory statement about the client that the individual had
previously made).
205. E.g., Mims v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800, 801, 802 (5th Cir.1952).
206. E.g., Taylor v. McDaniels, 281 P. 967, 972, 973 (Okla. 1929); see also Kan. City, M.
& B. R. Co. v. Delaney, 52 S.W. 151, 152–53 (Tenn. 1899) (involving an employee who
enlisted a friend to contact his employer in an attempt to convince the employer to provide the
employee with a reference for a new job).
207. E.g., Billings v. Fairbanks, 136 Mass. 177, 178 (1883); Ely, 39 Ohio C.C. at 278; Nott,
38 Vt. at 31; see also Warr v. Jolly (1834) 172 Eng. Rep. 1336; 6 Car. & P. 497 (involving
friend who accompanied plaintiff and assisted plaintiff in asking questions of defendant).
208. See, e.g., Delaney, 52 S.W. at 153; Taylor, 281 P. at 970.
209. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977).
210. See, e.g.,   Shinglemeyer   v.   Wright,   82   N.W.   887,   891   (Mich.   1900)   (“There   is   no  
difference in principle between reading a letter to another and soliciting a person to make a
similar verbal statement.”);;  see also Fonville  v.  M’Nease,  23  S.C.L.  303,  311  (Dud. 1838)  (“If  
the plaintiff afterwards makes public the charge, the defendant is not answerable for the
consequences—for the act of publication  is  not  his.”).
211. See, e.g., Delaney, 52 S.W. at 153 (stating that delivery of a defamatory letter to the
plaintiff’s   agent   was   not   a   publication);;   Taylor, 281 P. at 972 (concluding that there   “was   no  
publication”  under  these  circumstances  because  the  communications  “were  of  the  same  effect as
though  made  to  the  plaintiff  himself”).
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requirement.212
Other courts accepted the idea that a defendant’s defamatory
statements under these circumstances could amount to a publication, but
held that the defendant’s statements were conditionally privileged.213
Under this approach, the defendant’s statements were privileged
provided they were “given in truth, honesty, and fairness”214 or were not
made out of malice.215 Interestingly, the authors of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts cited some of these qualified privilege cases to
support their rule establishing an absolute privilege.216
Notably, courts currently use these two approaches in cases
involving intracompany communications. Where, for example, one
supervisor makes a defamatory statement about an employee to another
supervisor within the same company, some jurisdictions conclude that
this is, in effect, the employer speaking to itself; thus, there has been no
publication to a third party.217 Other courts conclude that there is a
publication under these circumstances, but that the publication is
conditionally privileged because the speaker and recipient share a
common interest.218 The Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the latter
position.219
Where, however, the defamatory communication is between the
defendant and the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s agent, the Restatement
(Second) of Torts articulates a different rule and concludes that the
publication   is   absolutely   privileged   on   the   basis   of   the   plaintiff’s  
consent.220 This is inconsistent with the bulk of the case law decided
before the publication of the original Restatement. A few of the older
decisions involving these scenarios mention the concept of consent,221
and in rare instances courts decided the cases on these grounds.222
212. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577   cmt.   m   (“One   who   communicates  
defamatory matter directly to the defamed person, who himself communicates it to a third
person, has not published the matter to the third  person  if  there  are  no  other  circumstances.”);;  
see also Starr v. Pearle Vision, Inc., 54 F.3d 1548, 1554 (10th Cir. 1995) (refusing to recognize
a claim based on the plaintiff’s  self-publication of defamatory material).
213. E.g., Switzer v. Am. Ry. Express Co., 112 S.E. 110, 116 (S.C. 1922); see also Beeler
v. Jackson, 2 A. 916, 917 (Md. 1886); Christopher v. Akin, 101 N.E. 971, 972 (Mass. 1913);
Warr v. Jolly (1834) 172 Eng. Rep. 1336; 6 Car. & P. 497.
214. Beeler, 2 A. at 917.
215. Christopher, 101 N.E. at 972; Warr, 172 Eng. Rep. at 1336.
216. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §  583  Reporter’s  Note  (1977)  (citing  Beeler, 2 A.
916, Christopher, 101 N.E. 971, and Warr, 172 Eng. Rep. 1336).
217. E.g., Dixon v. Econ. Co., 477 So. 2d 353, 354 (Ala. 1985).
218. E.g., Bals v. Verduzco, 600 N.E.2d 1353, 1356 (Ind. 1992).
219. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 cmt. e (1976).
220. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 (1977).
221. See, e.g., Shinglemeyer v. Wright, 82 N.W. 887, 891 (Mich. 1900).
222. See, e.g., Heller v. Howard, 11 Ill. App. 554, 559–60, (Ill. App. Ct. 1882); Sutton v.
Smith, 13 Mo. 120, 121–22 (1850).
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However, the cases were far more commonly decided on the grounds of
publication or conditional privilege than consent.223 Despite this, the
authors of the original Restatement chose to treat these kinds of cases as
consent cases that conferred upon defendants an absolute privilege.
Following the publication of the original Restatement and the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, courts began to more frequently invoke
the concept of consent in such cases.224 Indeed, some decisions
specifically referenced the Restatements to support the idea that the
consent defense controlled the outcomes of the cases.225 Thus, it seems
clear that the Restatements influenced the development of the law in this
area. Rather than “restating” the existing law, however, the authors,
without explanation, took a situation that had largely been dealt with as
a question of publication or conditional privilege and recharacterized it
as one of consent.
Interestingly, one of the decisions cited by the authors in a different
part of the Reporter’s Note actually ridicules the Restatements’ position
on the subject of invited or procured defamatory statements. In
Luzenberg   v.   O’Malley,226 a 1906 opinion from Louisiana, the
defendant publicly expressed the opinion that, for “reasons too
numerous to mention,” the plaintiff was unfit to be district attorney or
even practice law.227 The plaintiff then challenged the defendant to list
some of those reasons too numerous to mention. The defendant
responded by publicly making false and defamatory statements about
the plaintiff.228 After the plaintiff sued, the defendant defended on the
grounds that by inviting the defendant to publish the reasons behind its
opinion that the plaintiff was unfit to be district attorney, the plaintiff
had consented to the ensuing defamatory publication. The Louisiana
Supreme Court stated this argument “would not be taken seriously by us
if it were not being insisted upon with apparent seriousness.”229 The
court thought it obvious that “when plaintiff challenged defendant to
name the ‘reasons too numerous to mention’ why he was unfit to be
district attorney, or even to practice law, he did not request defendant to
publish malicious falsehoods about him.”230

223. See cases cited supra notes 208–216.
224. The  Reporter’s  Note to § 583 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts cites several cases
decided after the publication of the original Restatement that either reference the consent
concept or decide the case on those grounds. See, e.g., Peterson v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel.
Co., 349 F.2d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Sch. Dist. of Springfield R-12, 447 S.W.2d
256, 268 (Mo. 1969).
225. E.g., Peterson, 349 F.2d at 938; Williams, 447 S.W.2d at 268–69.
226. 41 So. 41 (La. 1906).
227. Id. at 42.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 44.
230. Id.
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3. Consent to Investigation
Finally, the authors chose to create a special (and internally
inconsistent) rule for the situation in which an individual consents to an
investigation and agrees to the publication of the findings of the
investigation. In doing so, they chose to rely on a poorly reasoned
British case that is rarely invoked by British courts for the principle
cited in the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
As discussed, comment d to § 583 contains the doctrinally
inconsistent observation that the absolute privilege of consent applies
when a plaintiff “agrees to submit his conduct to investigation knowing
that its results will be published,” provided the investigators conduct a
“fair and honest” investigation and publish their “honest findings.”231
The authors included the following illustration of that principle:
A, a horse trainer, holds a license granted by the B Racing
Association, a rule of which empowers the stewards of the
club to suspend licenses, to inquire into and deal with
matters concerning racing, and to publish the result in a
racing magazine. The stewards, upon a fair and honest
investigation of a particular race, publish their findings in
the racing magazine, stating that the horse that A trained
had been drugged and that A’s license has been withdrawn.
A has consented to the publication.232
The illustration is based on the British case of Chapman v. Lord
Ellesmere.233 In Chapman, the publication that appeared in the racing
magazine reported that an investigation revealed that a horse   (“Don  
Pat”)  had  been  drugged   and  that  his  trainer  had  been  suspended.234 As
written, the statement could reasonably be read as implying that the
trainer himself had drugged the horse and this is why he had been
suspended. However, this is not what the stewards had concluded.
Instead, the stewards concluded that someone had drugged the horse
and that the trainer, being directly responsible for the care of the horse,
was negligent in failing to prevent the drugging.235 According to Lord
Slesser, the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria resolved the matter—by
assenting to the publication of the findings of the investigation, the
plaintiff consented to the resulting defamatory publication.236
There are several ways of viewing the decision in Chapman. One is
231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 583 & cmt. d (1977); e.g., id. § 583 cmt. d, illus.
3.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

Id. § 583 cmt. d, illus. 3.
[1932] 2 K.B. 431 (Eng).
Id. at 460.
Id. at 459.
Id. at 463.
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simply that the case is something of a relic. The decision hinges on the
arcane defamation concept of innuendo,237 and   the   court’s   conclusion
that the report that appeared in the magazine was, in fact, a true report
of  the  stewards’  findings.  A  modern  jury  could  easily  conclude  that  the  
publication was misleading enough to be treated as a false and
inaccurate   statement   of   the   stewards’   findings. Lord Slesser himself
acknowledged  that  if  the  report  did  not  accurately  reflect  the  stewards’  
findings, the defense of consent would not apply.238 As   the   plaintiff’s  
lawyer argued, in that instance, the resulting publication (an inaccurate
account of the findings) would have been substantially different than to
which the plaintiff actually consented (an accurate account of the
findings).239
Second,   Lord   Slesser’s   contention   that   the   defense   of   consent   even  
applied to the case is merely dicta and highly suspect dicta at that.
According to Lord Slesser, by agreeing to the report of the decision, the
plaintiff assumed the risk that the report, while perhaps literally true,
would be presented in such a way as to be materially misleading.240 This
is too much to swallow. One could perhaps conclude that the plaintiff
assumed the risk that the stewards would investigate the facts and
incorrectly (but in good faith) conclude that the plaintiff had drugged
Don Pat. The plaintiff did not know what the results of the investigation
would be in that regard, but he did know the particular subject matter
that they would involve (the rules of the racing association). Thus, the
ultimate  findings  of  the  stewards  would  be  a  “known  unknown.”  In  this  
respect, the case would be roughly analogous to the special rules
regarding consent in the context of athletic competitions. By consenting
to play a game of football, for example, an individual consents to what
would otherwise amount to unlawful batteries, provided the batteries
occur within the rules of the game or occur outside the rules but in a
manner foreseeable in the sense of being connected to the essence of the
game.241 The fact that the individual cannot predict exactly when or
237. This   involves   the   situation   in   which   “the   defamatory meaning, or innuendo, is not
apparent   on   the   face   of   the   publication   but   must   be   made   out   by   proof   of   extrinsic   facts.”  
William L. Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1629, 1630 (1966).
238. Chapman, 2 K.B. at 463–64.
239. See id. at 463 (summarizing the plaintiff’s  argument).
240. Id. at 464.
241. See Avila v. Citrus Cmty. Coll. Dist., 131 P.3d 383, 393, 394 (Cal. 2006) (concluding
that the plaintiff assumed the risk of being hit by a pitch intentionally thrown at him by the
pitcher because such conduct  was  not  “totally  outside  the  range  of  ordinary  activity  involved  in  
the  sport”  and  was  an  accepted  custom  of  the  game);;  Turcotte  v.  Fell,  502  N.E.2d  964,  969–70,
971 (N.Y. 1986) (discussing assumption of the risk and contrasting inherent dangers assumed
with  “flagrant  infractions  unrelated  to  the  normal  method  of  playing  the  game  and  done  without  
any   competitive   purpose”);;   Ray   Yasser,   In the Heat of Competition: Tort Liability of One
Participant  to  Another;;  Why  Can’t  Participants  Be Required to Be Reasonable?, 5 SETON HALL
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how the contact will occur does not prevent the consent from being
effective.
But it is hard to see how the plaintiff in Chapman could be said to
have assumed the risk that the author of the report would have such
little facility with language that he would misstate the findings of the
stewards in such a dramatic   fashion.   This   risk   would   be   an   “unknown  
unknown.”   Finding   consent   under   these   facts   would   be   roughly  
equivalent to concluding that a football player consented to a hit by
another player that had no competitive purpose, or to being run over on
the sidelines by a cart driven recklessly by an employee of the stadium.
In each of these instances, the resulting invasion was unforeseeable in
any meaningful sense and the plaintiff could not be said to have
assumed the risk of their occurrences. Thus, Lord Slesser’s  decision  in  
Chapman seems a slim reed upon which to base the rules governing
consent in the defamation context. 242
Instead, the case was perhaps better decided in the manner presented
by the two other judges in the case: conditional privilege. The relevant
holdings in the case actually involve the concept of conditional
privilege. For example, Lord Romer reasoned that the parties involved
(the stewards, the plaintiff, and those interested in racing) shared a
common interest in the investigation and that the publication was
therefore  privileged  absent  malice  on  the  defendants’  part.243 Likewise,
Lord Hanforth viewed the case as involving a question of qualified
privilege.244 In fact, British courts have most commonly cited Chapman
for the issue of privilege presented by the facts of the case.245 Thus,
there  is  some  irony  that  Lord  Slusser’s  poorly reasoned dicta continues
to influence defamation law in the United States when it has had little
influence in its native country.

J. SPORT L. 253,  256  (1995)  (stating  that  the  “prevailing  view  is  that  although  participation  in  an  
athletic contest involves manifestation of consent to those bodily contacts which are permitted
by the rules of the game and foreseeable, an intentional act causing injury, which goes beyond
what is ordinarily permissible in an unforeseeable way, is an assault and battery for which
recovery  may  be  had”).
242. Interestingly, this aspect of the Chapman decision perhaps explains the origins of the
Restatements’ “reason   to   know”   standard.   Dean Prosser cites the case for the idea that one
consents to a defamatory publication when one is unsure what a defendant will say but has
reason to know that it may be defamatory. KEETON ET AL., supra note 101.
243. Chapman, 2 K.B. at 473–74.
244. Id. at 448–49.
245. See, e.g., GKR Karate (UK) Ltd. v. Yorkshire Post Newspapers Ltd. (No.2) [2000]
E.M.L.R. 410 (Q.B.), at 416–17 (Eng.); Watts v. Times Newspapers Ltd., [1997] Q.B. 650 at
655 (Eng.); Seaga v. Harper, [2008] UKPC 9 [5]–[6], [2009] A.C. 1 (P.C.) at 6–7 (appeal taken
from Jam.); Baigent v. McCulloch, (1997) Rep. L.R. 107, 109 (Scot.).
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B. Seeking a Policy-Based Justification for the Consent Rule in
Defamation Cases
In the absence of historical support for the rules articulated in § 583,
another approach would be to inquire whether there are any policybased justifications for the rule. The traditional justifications for
recognizing consent as a defense in tort cases provide little support for
the rules.246 For example, one of the most common justifications is that
when an individual consents to what would otherwise be a wrongful act,
the defendant is no longer a wrongdoer.247 Obviously, this justification
carries little weight when the individual does not know in advance the
particular wrong that is to be inflicted and the wrongdoer does not
reasonably believe that the individual consents to the particular conduct.
Nor do autonomy and efficiency based justifications for absolving a
defendant of liability under a consent theory apply with much force
when an individual is forced to assume a risk she did not appreciate in
advance.248 Instead, if the expansive conception of consent as outlined
in the Restatements is inconsistent with the traditional justifications for
recognizing consent as a defense in other intentional tort cases, perhaps
there is something special about the nature of defamation that merits a
special rule.

246. Professor Kenneth W. Simons catalogued the following justifications:
[P]laintiff should not obtain the benefits of a choice without incurring the
expected risks; sometimes defendant has not acted tortiously by offering such
a   choice;;   sometimes   defendant   relies   upon   plaintiff’s   choice;;   plaintiff is the
“co-author  of  his  own  harm;;”  individual choice will be undermined if it is not
enforced against the later wishes of the chooser; and recognizing autonomous
choice increases social wealth.
Simons, supra note 48, at 218–19.
247. Leo Katz, Choice, Consent, and Cycling: The Hidden Limitations of Consent, 104
MICH. L. REV. 627, 628 (2006).
248. The defense of assumption of the risk, which (where still recognized at least) is a
defense to a negligence action, depends on the plaintiff’s  subjective  awareness and appreciation
of  the  risk  encountered.  ADM  P’ship  v.  Martin,  702  A.2d  730,  734  (Md.  1997).  The  defenses  of  
consent and assumption of the risk share much in common. See Simons, supra note 48, at 248
(“Assumption of risk is often casually described as the doctrine of consent applied to
nonintentional   torts,   and   especially   to   negligence.”).   Likewise,   to   the   extent   one   justifies   the  
defense of consent through resort to bargain or reliance theories—see e.g., Marin Roger
Scordato, Innocent Threats, Concealed Consent, and the Necessary Presence of Strict Liability
in Traditional Fault-Based Tort Law, 37 PEPP. L. REV. 205, 219 (2010) (arguing that consent
involves  “two-party interaction between the plaintiff and the defendant,”  in  which  the  defendant  
“claims  that  his  otherwise  tortious  behavior  was  undertaken  in  response  to  and  in  reliance upon
the  plaintiff’s  consent  to  that  behavior”)—these justifications falter when the plaintiff does not
know what he is bargaining for and the defendant does not reasonably believe the plaintiff has
bargained for what he has received.
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1. A Plaintiff’s Reduced Reputational Interest
Perhaps a broader rule of consent is justified on the nature of the
plaintiff’s interest in defamation cases. Perhaps tort law considers
damage to one’s reputation to be of significantly less importance than
damage to one’s person or property.249 If this is so, the law should limit
the number of defamation claims so as not to overburden the courts and
unduly  limit  a  defendant’s  countervailing free speech interests. A broad
conception of consent would be consistent with the view of a plaintiff’s
reduced interest in his reputation. By making consent to a defamatory
publication an absolute defense and one that is far easier for a defendant
to assert than in other tort cases, a court can avoid messy questions
involving the defendant’s fault and bad faith. This view of the limited
utility of defamation claims might also help to justify the incredibly
complicated collection of common law and constitutional rules
governing defamation claims, many of which make it more difficult for
certain kinds of plaintiffs to prevail.250
There is, however, a strong strain in American culture that takes
seriously reputational harms. Professor Daniel Solove states that
“[t]hroughout most of western history, one’s reputation and character
have been viewed as indispensable to self-identity and the ability to
engage in public life. For centuries, the loss of social regard has had
deleterious effects on one’s wealth, prosperity, and employment.”251
When the Supreme Court first recognized that the First Amendment
demands that public figures establish a high degree of fault on a
defendant’s part in order to prevail on a defamation claim, the Court
also noted that states were, in some other instances, free to adopt lower
fault standards or even rely upon strict liability standards.252 When
given these options, state courts have overwhelmingly chosen to retain
or adopt these lower thresholds for recovery.253 Indeed, the tort of

249. See Rodney A. Smolla, Let the Author Beware: The Rejuvenation of the American
Law of Libel, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1,  18  (1983)  (“The  social  usefulness of providing legal redress
for  injury  to  one’s  reputation  and  psychological  injury  generally  continues  to  be  questioned.”).
But see Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 782,
801   (1986)   (“[R]eputation   .   .   .   is   one   of the bundle of property rights and liberty that all
individuals   enjoy.”); Laura A. Heymann, The Law of Reputation and the Interest of the
Audience, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1341, 1342 (2011) (noting property-based   conceptions   of   one’s  
reputational interest).
250. See Smolla, supra note 249, at 48 (noting the distinctions defamation law draws
between  different  plaintiffs  and  defendants  and  stating  that  “[t]he complexity inherent in these
basic distinctions is indicative of the effect of imposing new constitutional standards in what had
already  been  a  confusing  area  of  the  law”).
251. Daniel A. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 551 (2006).
252. See Smolla, supra note 249, at 33–34.
253. Id. at 34–35.
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defamation is rooted in strict liability.254 Professor Rodney Smolla
argues that “American courts have frequently been of two minds in their
solicitude for reputation, at times permitting harsh penalties for
defamatory speech well out of proportion to the harm of the words or
the culpability of the speaker, and at times permitting obviously
damaging speech uttered with transparently dark motives to be spoken
with complete impunity.”255 Thus, while an expansive conception of
consent in the defamation context might be consistent with one school
of thought among American courts regarding the value of defamation
claims, it hardly reflects the sole or even dominant view of such claims.
2. The Nature of the Wrong in Defamation Actions
Another possible explanation for an expanded conception of consent
in the defamation context lies in the manner in which slander or libel is
accomplished. If A manifests willingness to allow B to walk through A’s
yard, B’s range of action is circumscribed in a manner easily understood
by both parties. If B rides his motorcycle onto A’s property or walks
across the property with a gang of friends, B has exceeded the scope of
consent.256 What’s more, there are only so many ways B can walk
through A’s yard and still be deemed to have engaged in the particular
conduct to which A consented. A can easily predict the manner in which
B is likely to walk across the yard, and B probably has a clear
understanding of what A considers permissible. B might walk briskly,
he might walk slowly, he might walk with a limp, but it will be the
unusual case in which B walks through A’s yard in a manner that places
him outside the scope of A’s consent.257 But as anyone who ever played
the telephone game as a child can attest, the words another individual
will speak are much more difficult to predict. Language is a notoriously
imprecise means of communication, and unless A and B have agreed in
advance to the exact words B may use, it is likely that B will say
something that A did not fully anticipate. A and B may think they
understand the permissible bounds of B’s statements, but the exact
words that B uses in good faith may be quite different than what A
expected.
Perhaps, then, § 583’s standard can be justified as a way of
accommodating the imprecision of language. By allowing a defendant
254. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 401, at 1120 (2000) (noting the history of
defamation as a strict liability tort); Smolla, supra note 249, at 33 (noting that strict liability
“remained  the  operative  law”  prior  to  a  series  of  Supreme  Court  decisions).
255. Smolla, supra note 249, at 16.
256. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A cmt. e (1977).
257. An obvious example would be if B walked across A’s  yard  carrying  a  sign  protesting  
some action on the part of A. But a court would probably have little difficulty concluding that
B’s  actions  were  substantially different than that to which A consented.
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to claim the absolute defense of consent when the plaintiff had reason to
know that the defendant’s statement might be defamatory in the general
sense, § 583 gives defendants the “breathing space” they need to
communicate while giving full effect to the First Amendment concerns
at issue.258 The same theory could also apply to § 583’s  rule regarding
invited or procured defamation.
However, existing defamation rules already provide courts with a
vehicle for dealing with these concerns that meshes nicely with the
standard rules for consent. If a defendant’s statements are true, there is
of course no liability for defamation.259 But a statement need not be the
literal, 100% truth to qualify as being “true” for purposes of defamation
liability. It is enough that the gist or sting of the defamatory is true. 260 In
other words, substantial truth is enough for a statement to be “true.”261
This is actually quite similar to the traditional definition of consent.
Consistent with the general consent standard in other contexts, a
plaintiff’s consent to a defamatory publication would be effective only
where the plaintiff consented to the particular defamatory statement or
substantially the same statement.262 This standard seems adequate to
reflect the realities of human communication, while providing
defendants with a reasonable amount of breathing space in terms of
their communications.
Finally, the uncertain nature of the wrong involved in defamation
cases actually cuts against the recognition of a true absolute privilege in
cases like Chapman. Cases like Chapman, in which the defendant
publishes the results of an investigation, at first glance seem to cry out
for a special rule given the uncertainty of what the defendant will say. It
is tempting to treat these cases as implicating the defense of consent.
After all, the plaintiff has consented to the publication of the findings of
the investigation. But even the authors of the Restatements seemed to
recognize   that,   given   the   plaintiff’s   lack   of   certainty   as   to   what   the  
defendant   might   say,   the   plaintiff’s   consent   could   not   be   treated   as   a  
true absolute defense. Instead, the authors hedged on the consent issue
and treated consent in this context as establishing a conditional
privilege, while inexplicably insisting they were recognizing an absolute
privilege.

258. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271–72 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
259. Rice v. Hodapp, 919 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Mo.1996); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 581A (1977).
260. Rouch v. Enquirer & News of Battle Creek Mich., 487 N.W.2d 205, 214 (Mich.
1992).
261. Id. at 214–15.
262. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(b) (1979).
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3. Preventing Plaintiff Trickery
The primary concern underlying § 583’s expanded conception of
consent seems to have been preventing a plaintiff from baiting a
defendant into making a defamatory statement for purposes of bringing
a defamation claim. Similar concerns over allowing a plaintiff to profit
by repeating a defamatory publication are also present in decisions
concluding that there has been no publication when the plaintiff himself
repeats the defendant’s defamatory statements.263 The concern over a
party “inviting or inducing indiscretion and thereby laying the
foundation of a lawsuit for his own pecuniary gain”264 appears
repeatedly in defamation cases, dating back well into the nineteenth
century.265 The Reporter’s Note to § 583 also lists this concern in
supporting the rule.266 One court has cited the prevention of such action
as “[o]ne of the primary purposes of the doctrine of consent in
defamation law.”267 Indeed, although there is little authority predating
publication of the original Restatement in support of applying a consent
theory in these cases, some of that very limited authority cites this
concern as the justification for the rule.268
If plaintiff trickery is the primary concern in these cases, § 583’s
expanded definition of consent is a woefully overly inclusive means of
addressing the problem. Application of the rules in § 583 may preclude
recovery in the numerous instances in which an individual, in good
faith, seeks to discern the reasons behind a defendant’s adverse actions
or opinions or enlists another in a similar effort. The rules cause such
preclusion even when the defendant responds with a knowing falsehood
263. See Layne v. Builders Plumbing Supply Co., 569 N.E.2d 1104, 1111 (Ill. App. Ct.
1991)   (“[T]he availability of increased damages might encourage publication of a defamatory
statement by a plaintiff who reasonably could have avoided such republication or could have
tried to explain to a prospective employer the true nature of the situation and to contradict the
defamatory   statement.”);;   see also Pamela G. Posey, Note, Employer Defamation: The Role of
Qualified Privilege, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 469, 483 (1989) (stating that recognizing the selfpublication  theory  “is  an  open  invitation for the discharged employee to create his own wrong,
implicate the defendant of his choice, aggravate rather than mitigate damages, and collect for the
self-inflicted  injury”).
264. Royer v. Steinberg, 90 Cal. App. 3d 490, 499 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979).
265. See, e.g., Gordon v. Spencer, 2 Blackf. 286, 288 (Ind. 1829); Richardson v. Gunby,
127 P. 533, 536 (Kan. 1912); Howland v. George F. Blake Mfg. Co., 31 N.E. 656, 658 (Mass.
1892).
266. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §  583  Reporter’s  Note  (1977).
267. Royer, 90 Cal. App. 3d at 499; see also Lee v. Paulsen, 539 P.2d 1079, 1080 (Or.
1975) (“The  reason  for  the  imposition  of  the  privilege  when  the  plaintiff  consents  or  requests  the  
publication is based upon the unwillingness of the courts to let the plaintiff lay the foundation of
a lawsuit for his own pecuniary gain.”  (internal  quotations  marks  omitted)).
268. E.g., Sutton v. Smith, 13 Mo. 120, 123–24 (1850); see also Slander—Privileged
Communications—Publication Invited or Procured by Plaintiff, 24 HARV. L. REV. 232, 242
(1911).
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and even though the individual may have little reason to suspect that the
resulting publication will be defamatory in the manner it proved to be.
There are three possible alternatives to relying upon the strained and
anomalous conception of consent outlined in § 583 that could address
the trickery concern. The first would be to hold that there has been no
publication when an individual invites or procures a defamatory
publication. By eliminating the ability of a plaintiff to establish an
element of her prima facie case, this approach would have the same
practical effect as recognizing an absolute privilege of consent. It would
also give relatively little weight to an individual’s reputational interests.
The second approach would be to conclude that any invited or procured
defamatory publication is subject to a conditional privilege. The third
would be to allow a jury to inquire into whether it was the plaintiff’s
purpose in inviting or procuring the defamatory publication to decoy the
defendant into a defamation suit. If not, the plaintiff’s action would not
be barred. Courts had utilized each of these approaches prior to the
publication of the original Restatement.269 Thus, courts have other
means to deal with plaintiff trickery, and deviating from the normal
rules of consent in tort cases is unnecessary.
C. Do the Special Concerns Associated with Employment References
Justify a Different Rule?
If the concerns over the special nature of defamation claims can be
adequately addressed without resorting to a redefinition of traditional
notions of consent, perhaps there are special concerns involving the
employment reference scenario that justify the redefinition. If so, this
would not be the first time courts have sought to define the concept of
consent in light of the special concerns raised by a particular scenario.
The two most obvious examples are the special rules that have
developed regarding a patient’s consent to potentially risky medical
treatments and the special consent rules regarding participation in
athletic events.270
269. See supra notes 209–20 and accompanying text (discussing the older approaches to
cases of invited or procured defamation). In Nott v. Stoddard, 38 Vt. 25, 31 (1865), the Vermont
Supreme   Court   stated   that   “if   the   plaintiff caused the inquiry to be made as a trick, for the
purpose of inducing the defendant to utter a slander against her, she could not make the words
thus  elicited  a  ground  of  action.”  However,  “[i]f  the  inquiry  was  made  in  good  faith on the part
of the plaintiff and [a third party], merely to ascertain whether the defendant had made such a
charge, the words spoken on that occasion might be the ground of an action, as the defendant
would have no right to avail himself of that occasion to reiterate the slander to gratify his ill-will
or malice toward  the  plaintiff.”
270. See Timothy Davis, Avila v. Citrus Community College District: Shaping the
Contours of Immunity and Primary Assumption of the Risk, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 259, 282
(2006) (discussing the concept of consent in sporting event cases); Margaret Z. Johns, Informed
Consent: Requiring Doctors to Disclose Off-Label Prescriptions and Conflicts of Interest, 58
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In the case of employment references, it is easy to identify the
special concerns that might justify a reformulation of the traditional
rules regarding consent. An expanded conception of consent, combined
with employers’ willingness to rely upon express consent agreements
and waivers, could encourage more employers to provide references.
Prospective employers might benefit from this arrangement in terms of
their ability to acquire the information necessary to make intelligent
hiring decisions. Good employees might benefit in terms of their
increased ability to land quality jobs due to the willingness of former
employers to provide references. And society at large might benefit in
terms of increased productivity and efficiency as a result of the better
matching between employer and employee that can take place.271
Militating against an expanded conception of consent is the reality
that a defamatory job reference can have dramatic consequences for an
employee’s job prospects. There is also the reality that most employees
do not consent to an employer’s provision of a reference in the way we
normally think of consent.272 Prospective employees have little
meaningful choice when it comes to consenting to a reference or
background check;273 if an applicant wants a job, she will probably sign
whatever form or check whatever box the prospective employer puts in
front of her. While this reality, standing alone, is not necessarily a
reason for invalidating the applicant’s consent, it is hardly a reason that
supports an expanded definition of consent in the reference context.274
In addition, there is the question of how much society truly benefits
from an expansive conception of consent in the case of employment
references.275 The willingness of courts to enforce broadly worded
HASTINGS L.J. 967, 1008–12 (2007) (discussing evolving conceptions of informed consent in the
case of medical treatment). The question of how consent should be defined has also arisen in the
case of experimental procedures in which medical science is ignorant of all of the potential risks
associated with a procedure. See Lars Noah, Informed Consent and the Elusive Dichotomy
Between Standard and Experimental Therapy, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 361, 384 (2002) (noting that
“some   commentators   have   wondered   whether   it   even   makes   sense   to   speak   of   ‘informed’  
consent in  the  research  setting”  since  investigators  do  not  know  all  of  the  risks  involved  and are
therefore unable to fully inform patients of the risks).
271. See Verkerke, supra note 1,   at   133   (discussing   references   and   arguing   that   “labor  
market efficiency depends to a great extent on matching workers to jobs for which they are well
suited”).
272. See DOBBS, supra note 254,   §   412,   at   1156   (“There   are   elements   of   economic  
compulsion  in  some  such  cases  .  .  .  .”).
273. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 8, at 132 (noting that coercion is a concern in
such cases).
274. See DOBBS, supra note 254, § 412, at 1156 (suggesting that consent in such cases
“should  not  be  interpreted  to  permit publication  of  a  knowing  or  reckless  falsehood”).
275. See Finkin & Dau-Schmidt, supra note 3, at 399 (expressing skepticism that the law
should  “allow  an  employer  to  escape  legal  scrutiny  altogether  when,  for  example,  it  knowingly  
asserts a completely baseless accusation of malfeasance as the ground of discharge, uses the
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releases might increase the willingness of some employers to provide
more detailed employment references. However, if history is any guide,
many employers will still decline to do so simply because they are risk
adverse and because they receive little benefit in providing
references.276 Ultimately, there is at least some question as to what more
the law can realistically do in terms of tweaking the rules regarding
defamation to encourage the flow of employment references. In the
meantime, some employees are forced to bear the cost of knowingly
false and defamatory references—a result with no societal benefits.
Perhaps the strongest argument favoring an expansive definition of
consent in the reference context is that for references to be useful,
employers must have the freedom to provide honest opinions about an
employee’s work performance. The basic facts associated with an
employee’s former employment may be helpful to a prospective
employer. But most prospective employers also want to hear subjective
evaluations of an employee’s work performance and collegiality, hence
the common question from prospective employers: “Would you rehire
this individual?”277 A negative opinion about an employee’s work
performance is far more likely to be damaging to the employee’s job
prospects than a misstatement of pure fact and thus more likely to result
in a defamation claim. At the same time, it is more difficult for an
employer to prove the “truth” of an opinion than it is the truth of an
actual fact, thus potentially resulting in fewer pretrial decisions made as
a matter of law.
If the primary justification for an expanded definition of consent is
the need to preserve the ability of employers to provide honest opinions
in their references, there are already measures in place in many
jurisdictions that strive to do just that. First, despite the Supreme
Court’s conclusion that the First Amendment does not automatically
shield statements of opinion from defamation actions,278 there are
numerous rules that work to protect defendants who give their
opinions.279 In the reference context, the most relevant would be that
reference as a retaliatory device, or uses the threat of a malicious reference as a disciplinary
cudgel”).
276. See supra note 33–34 and accompanying text (noting the high risk and low benefit to
employers providing references and the resulting decline in the willingness of employers to
provide detailed references despite the proliferation of reference immunity statutes).
277. See, e.g.,  Eitler  v.  St.  Joseph  Reg’l  Med. Ctr. South–Bend Campus, Inc., 789 N.E.2d
497, 499 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (involving a reference form asking this question as well as other
subjective questions).
278. See Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 21 (1990).
279. These include the idea that there is no liability when the statement of opinion does
“not  contain  a  provably  false  factual  connotation,” id.  at  20,  “cannot  ‘reasonably  [be]  interpreted  
as  stating  actual  facts,’”  id. (quoting Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988)),
or   consists   merely   of   “rhetorical   hyperbole.”   Id. at 17; see also Joseph W. King, Defamation
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there can be no liability when the underlying facts forming the basis for
that opinion are disclosed and are themselves accurate.280 Thus, as long
as the employer explains the factual basis for an adverse opinion and
does so in a truthful manner, there should be no liability.
In addition, employer reference statutes may provide employers with
qualified immunity for statements of opinion concerning an employee’s
job performance. Many reference statutes are written broadly enough to
cover an employer’s opinions concerning an employee’s job
performance,281 including an employee’s habits,282 attitude and effort,283
ability or inability to perform job duties,284 and any performance
evaluations that may have been conducted.285 A few reference statutes
even specifically provide qualified immunity to an employer who
responds to a question concerning whether the employer would rehire
the employee.286 Thus, to the extent there is concern that the threat of
litigation may chill the willingness of employers to provide opinions
about employees, narrowly tailored employer reference statutes may
provide a means to address this concern.
V. A RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW REGARDING CONSENT IN THE
DEFAMATION AND REFERENCE CONTEXTS
Defamation cases and employment reference cases involve a
difficult balancing of interests. However, the special concerns present in
defamation cases and employment reference cases can be addressed
without drastically expanding the defense of consent. The following
Part advances a restatement and clarification of the rules regarding
consent in the defamation and employment reference contexts.
Claims Based on Parody and Other Fanciful Communications Not Intended to Be Understood
as Fact, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 875, 878 (listing four bases for classifying a statement as protected
opinion).
280. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 566 (1977).
281. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1361(C) (West, Westlaw through 1st Reg.
Sess., 51st Legis. 2013) (providing qualified immunity to an employer who provides
information about the reason for   an   employee’s   termination   or   about   job   performance,
professional conduct, or an evaluation); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 28-6.4-1(c) (West, Westlaw through
ch. 491 of Jan. 2012 Sess.) (providing   qualified   immunity   to   an   employer   who   provides   “fair  
and   unbiased”   information about an employee’s   job   performance);;   TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1105 (West, Westlaw through end of 2012 2d Reg. Sess.) (same).
282. COLO. REV. STAT. § 8-2-114(1)(b), (3) (West, Westlaw through ch. 1–4 & 6 of 1st
Reg. Sess., Gen. Assemb. 2013).
283. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(A)(5), (C)(4) (West, Westlaw through end of 2012).
284. GA. CODE ANN. § 34-1-4(b) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.).
285. E.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23:291(A) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-65(C)(4); UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-42-1 (West, Westlaw through 2012
Reg. Sess.).
286. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 47(c) (West, Westlaw through 2012 Reg. Sess.); COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN § 8-2-114(1)(a), (3).
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A. The General Standard
The general rule regarding consent that applies in all intentional tort
cases should be the same rule that applies in defamation cases
(including defamation cases stemming from negative references). Thus,
consent should be an absolute defense in a defamation action when the
plaintiff consented to the particular defamatory publication or to
substantially the same publication.287 This would mean that an
individual’s   consent   would   be   ineffective   where   the   defendant  
knowingly made a false statement or lacked a reasonable belief as to its
truthfulness, unless the individual knew in advance that the defendant
would make the particular statement. In such a case, the publication
would be of a different nature than that to which the individual
consented.288 This rule should be sufficient to cover most defamation
cases.
In the reference scenario, employers could still take advantage of
releases. However, they would be required to do so in a way that makes
clear to the employee the risks involved in consenting to the release of
information. Prospective employers could still require applicants to sign
consent forms releasing them from liability. The forms would shield
employers from liability, provided they listed the types of information
the responding employer could provide to the prospective employer and
the employee was aware of the factual information that was disclosed.
In addition to job titles and dates of employment, this information could
include such topics as whether the employee was voluntarily or
involuntarily separated from employment and the given reasons for the
separation, any performance evaluations that had previously been
provided to the employee, and any instances of threatening or harassing
conduct on the part of the employee.289 With each of these topics, an
employee should already have knowledge as to any defamatory
statements an employer might make. By listing each topic that can be
addressed, the risks associated with the release are brought home to the
employee. Consent under these circumstances would denote the
employee’s  actual  appreciation  of  the  potential  risks  involved.  To  make  
287. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 892A(2)(b) (1979) (stating that to be
effective,  consent  must  be  “to  the particular  conduct,  or  to  substantially  the  same  conduct”).
288. Alternatively, one could treat consent in the defamation context as a conditional
privilege, which may be lost upon a showing that the defendant knew the statement was false or
lacked a reasonable basis for making the statement. A few courts have done this. See supra note
35 and accompanying text. However, in light of the fact that most courts treat consent as an
absolute defense, the approach suggested here could be incorporated more easily into existing
law in most jurisdictions. Another possibility would be to conclude that the consent given in
such  a  case  was  based  on  the  individual’s  substantial  mistake, known to the defendant, that the
defendant would tell the truth or at least act reasonably when speaking.
289. Nebraska recently enacted a similar reference immunity statute. See NEB. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 48-201(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through end of 2013 Reg. Sess.).
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clear the scope of consent, the agreement should also indicate that the
employee’s   consent   only   extends   to   information   the   responding  
employer in good faith believes to be true after a reasonable
investigation.290 To the extent this clarification also encourages current
employers to negotiate similar agreements with or provide similar
notice to their current employees concerning what the employer will say
when asked for a reference, this would be an added bonus.291
B. Invited or Procured Defamation
The general rule should be that unless a plaintiff has consented to a
defamatory publication in accordance with the rule above, the fact that
the plaintiff has invited or procured a defamatory publication should
not, by itself, be an absolute bar to recovery. Thus, the fact that an
employee, in the presence of others, demands to know why she was
fired should not automatically pose an absolute bar to recovery. In the
reference scenario, this would mean that the fact that an employee has
solicited a former employer to provide a reference is likewise not, by
itself, an absolute bar to recovery. The rule should be that if an agent of
an employee contacts an employer in an attempt to learn why the
employee was fired, tries to convince the employer to change its mind
with respect to an adverse employment decision, or otherwise invites
the employer to explain an adverse decision, the employee has not
automatically consented to any resulting defamatory publication.
Instead, a plaintiff should be considered to have consented to a
defamatory publication by inviting the defendant to speak only where
the plaintiff knows with reasonable certainty in advance what the
defendant will say. Thus, for example, the employee who employs an
agent to pose as a prospective employer, and knows with reasonable
certainty in advance what the employer will say, has consented to the
ensuing defamatory publication. The doctrine of apparent consent
would apply if the defendant reasonably believed that the plaintiff was
consenting to a particular defamatory statement or to a substantially
similar statement. Thus, the employer who reasonably believes that an
employee already knows the reason she is being fired when she
demands that the reason be made public could claim the defense of
consent.
Absent consent in accordance with the general rule, employers and
other defendants should enjoy a conditional privilege when invited to
290. See, e.g., Mandelblatt v. Perelman, 683 F. Supp. 379, 381, 383–84 (S.D.N.Y. 1988)
(involving an agreement specifically premised upon a good-faith opinion based upon an
investigation).
291. See Halbert & Maltby, supra note 8, at 411–12 (suggesting that employers and
employees bargain over the information   to  be   conveyed   in   a   reference   prior   to   an   employee’s  
departure from employment).
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speak. The privilege should be lost upon a showing of whatever level of
fault—negligence, actual malice, bad faith, etc.—a jurisdiction typically
requires in the case of a conditional privilege. As discussed, courts
historically handled these kinds of cases either by applying a
conditional privilege or by concluding that there was no publication.292
Some courts continue to treat these cases as involving a question of
publication, concluding that there has been no publication to a third
party in these cases.293 However, there are several reasons why treating
these situations as involving publications subject to a conditional
privilege is preferable.
First, treating these cases as involving publications would be more
consistent with the traditional justifications for consent and human
nature. When an employee asks a former employer to provide a
reference or has a friend intervene on the employee’s behalf, the reality
is that the party ultimately responsible for making the ensuing
defamatory statement is still the employer. The employee may have
initiated the publication, but the employer can always choose to remain
silent in these situations. Indeed, where the employer lacked a goodfaith belief in what it said, it should have remained silent. Thus, a wrong
has been done, and the wrongdoer remains the employer. Moreover,
acknowledging the reality that there has, in fact, been a publication is
consistent with human nature in many cases. It is simply unrealistic, for
example, to expect an employee to remain in the dark as to the reasons
behind the employee’s termination or in a state of inertia after being
fired. If an employee is caught off guard by a firing, she will seek an
explanation, and if asking for an explanation in the presence of others or
asking a friend to intervene is the only option available, she will
probably pursue it. If an employee comes to suspect that an employer is
defaming her to other employers, she may well enlist an agent to
confirm her suspicions. The fact that that an employee took these
actions does not change the fact that the employer chose to respond and
that a third party received and understood the ensuing defamatory
statements.
In the related scenario involving intracompany defamatory
statements, contemporary decisions have recognized these same types
of realities.294 In concluding that a publication occurs when one
corporate officer defames an employee to another corporate officer, one
court concluded that pretending that there was no publication between
“individuals with distinct personalities and opinions” would ignore
292. See supra notes 209–20 and accompanying text.
293. E.g., Mims v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 200 F.2d 800, 802 (5th Cir.1952).
294. See DOBBS, supra note 254, § 402, at 1126 (stating  that  the  “contemporary  view”  is  
that a publication does occur when one member of the defaming organization makes a
defamatory statement about the plaintiff to another member of the same organization).
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reality.295 Those opinions can be influenced just as easily as a
publication between individuals in different companies and with the
same adverse effects on the plaintiff.296 In the “invited or procured”
scenario, the fact that the defamatory publication was made to an agent
of the plaintiff may mean that damages are limited. However, it does
not change the inescapable fact that publication occurred. Recognizing
this reality would allow courts to abandon the difficult-to-defend legal
fiction that the plaintiff has defamed himself.
The “invited  or  procured”  scenario involves the type of situation in
which the law typically recognizes a qualified privilege based on the
special relationship of the parties or the public interest in the free flow
of information.297 For example, courts typically hold that an employer is
conditionally privileged to inform its employees about the reasons
behind another employee’s termination.298 In addition to treating
intracompany publications as being subject to a conditional privilege,299
the Restatement (Second) of Torts takes the position that a publication
between an employer and the agent of an employee is conditionally
privileged.300 Thus, treating the “invited or procured” scenario as
involving a question of privilege rather than publication would be
295. Pirre v. Printing Devs., Inc., 468 F. Supp. 1028, 1041–42 (S.D. N.Y. 1979), aff’d, 614
F.2d 1290 (2d Cir. 1979).
296. See Luttrell v. United Tel. Sys., Inc., 683 P.2d 1292, 1294 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984)
(“Certainly,   damage   to   one’s   reputation   within   a   corporate   community   may   be   just   as  
devastating  as  that  effected  by  defamation  spread  to  the  outside.”), aff’d, 695 P.2d 1279 (Kan.
1985); Pirre, 468 F. Supp. at 1041 (stating that the opinions of corporate officers may be
influenced by the defamatory statements of another officer just as surely as others); DAVID A.
ELDER, DEFAMATION: A LAWYER’S GUIDE § 1:21 (2003) (citing cases and arguing in favor of
recognizing that a publication has occurred in the case of intracompany defamation).
297. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 596 (1977) (recognizing a qualified privilege
where parties share a common interest in the subject matter); id. § 598 (recognizing a qualified
privilege in the case of a communication to one who may act in the public interest).
298. E.g., Churchey v. Adolph Coors Co., 759 P.2d 1336, 1346 (Colo. 1988).
299. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §  577  cmt.  i  (stating  that  communication  “by  
one agent to another agent of the same principal is a publication,”   which   may   be   subject   to   a  
privilege).
300. See id. § 577 cmt.   e   (stating   that   “[t]he   fact   that   the   defamatory   matter   is  
communicated to an agent of the defamer does not prevent it from being a publication sufficient
to constitute actionable defamation,”   but   noting   that   the   communication   may   be   privileged).  
Section   584   adds   a   confusing   addition   to   this   idea.   Section   584   provides   that   “[a]n   honest  
inquiry or investigation by the person defamed to ascertain the existence, source, content or
meaning of a defamatory publication is not a defense to an action for its republication by the
defamer.”  Id. § 584. At first glance, this rule would seem to create an exception to the idea that
one who has invited or procured a defamatory publication has consented to the publication and
may not recover. However, comment e to § 584 notes that consent remains a complete defense.
Id. § 584 cmt. e. Thus, read in its entirety, § 584 suggests that a publication still occurs when a
plaintiff or his agent makes an honest inquiry regarding a defamatory publication, but that the
defendant may still invoke the defense of consent.
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consistent with tort law’s treatment of privilege more generally.
Ultimately, recognizing the existence of a conditional privilege when
an employee invites or procures the defamatory publication represents
the best means of balancing the competing interests present. Providing
employers with a privilege ensures a level of protection for employers,
which is maintained provided the employer acts in good faith. At the
same time, this approach provides a measure of protection for
employees’ reputational interests while furthering society’s interests in
the transmittal of honest employment references.
1. Attempts to Lure a Defendant into a Defamation Claim
To the extent jurisdictions remain concerned about the potential for
disgruntled employees to lure employers into making defamatory
publications for purposes of bringing a lawsuit, they could—by judicial
decision or legislative enactment—provide employers with an
additional affirmative defense to deal with this concern. If an employer
can establish that the employee or the employee’s agent invited the
employer to make a defamatory publication for the purpose of satisfying
the publication element of a defamation claim, an absolute privilege
would apply with respect to that statement. Thus, the employee could
not use the employer’s statement to the employee or the employee’s
agent as the basis for the claim. If instead the employee was engaged in
a good-faith attempt to determine what the employer would say or was
saying to others, the claim would not be barred.
In addition to addressing the concerns over manufactured claims,
this approach would enable employees and their agents to investigate
the reasons behind their terminations and whether their employers are
likely to defame them when asked for a reference. While there are
certainly legitimate concerns about permitting an employee to lure an
employer into making defamatory statements, there may be times when
having an agent pose as a prospective employer is an efficient and
acceptable means of rooting out unlawful and damaging behavior. This
situation is somewhat analogous to the case of “housing testers” in the
civil rights context. There, individuals posing as interested buyers or
renters seek to uncover evidence of discrimination among realtors and
landlords.301 The same approach has been used in other contexts to
uncover evidence of unlawful conduct.302 Courts have typically been
receptive to this type of evidence gathering, and have concluded that
301. E.g., Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 368 (1982) (involving the use of
testers to uncover racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act).
302. E.g., Smith v. Pac. Props. & Dev. Corp., 358 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 2004)
(involving the use of testers to uncover disability discrimination under the Fair Housing
Amendments Act); Kyles v. J.K. Guardian Sec. Servs., Inc., 222 F.3d 289, 292–93 (7th Cir.
2000) (involving the use of testers to uncover employment discrimination under Title VII).
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these testers have standing to sue.303 Provided the employee has not
employed illegal means to gather the evidence, the practice does not
seem sufficiently problematic to justify barring a plaintiff’s defamation
claim in light of its ability to root out evidence of unlawful behavior that
might otherwise go undetected.304
C. Fair and Honest Investigations
Finally, in the case of an individual who consents to the publication
of the findings of an investigation, it is debatable whether there is a
need for any type of special rule. The general consent rule and the
standard rules regarding qualified privileges should be adequate in the
vast majority of cases. Thus, the fact that one agrees to submit his
conduct to investigation knowing that its results will be published does
not necessarily mean that the individual has consented to a resulting
defamatory publication. In this instance, the individual may not know
with any degree of certainty what the results of the investigation will be.
If, however, the individual knows with reasonable certainty what the
contents of the resulting report will be, or executes a valid release, then
consent should be a defense. If the defense of consent does not apply,
the defendant could still theoretically claim a qualified privilege if the
defendant only discloses the results to those who share a common
interest in the matter.
If jurisdictions feel the need to craft a separate consent rule to deal
with this type of situation, then an individual should be treated as
having consented only to the publication of the honest and accurate
findings of a good-faith investigation conducted in a reasonable manner.
This is already essentially the rule contained in § 583 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts. However, it eliminates the confusion caused by the
Restatement’s illogical conclusion that an absolute privilege applies in
such cases. The rule is also consistent with the purposes underlying the
consent defense and the expectations of most individuals when they
submit their conduct to investigation. An individual who submits his
conduct to investigation is unlikely to know in advance the outcome;
however, he may reasonably believe that the potential benefits
associated with allowing the results to be published outweigh the risks.
303. E.g., Havens, 455 U.S. at 373–74; Pac. Props., 358 F.3d at 1104; Kyles, 222 F.3d at
297–98. But see Michael C. Duff, Union Salts as Administrative Private Attorneys General, 32
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 16–17 (2011) (discussing the unwillingness of the National
Labor Relations Board to apply these kinds of holdings to cases decided under the National
Labor Relations Act).
304. See Nat Stern, Implications of Libel Doctrine for Nondefamatory Falsehoods Under
the First Amendment, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 465,   492   (2012)   (“It   is   not   self-evident, for
example, that a misrepresentation of identity in the course of investigative reporting is of such
intrinsic  ‘evil’  that  no  ‘case-by-case  adjudication’  is  needed  before  it  is  subject  to  sanction.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2481938

2014]

THE FORGOTTEN ROLE OF CONSENT

777

If the investigation is being conducted pursuant to a contractual
arrangement, the individual has a contractual right to expect good faith
on the part of the investigators. Even if no formal contract exists, an
individual still has a right to expect that the investigation will be
conducted in good faith—which would include being conducted in a
reasonable manner—and that its results will be reported accurately and
in good faith.
CONCLUSION
Whether the result of conscious design or sloppy scholarship, the
authors of the Restatement (Second) of Torts crafted a series of rules
governing the defense of consent in defamation cases that are at odds
with the rest of tort law. The rules are also confusing and poorly
explained. All too often, the result has been that plaintiffs with
potentially valid defamation claims have lost at the pretrial stage or seen
jury verdicts overturned as courts rely on these flawed rules.
The employment reference scenario poses special problems for
policymakers. Despite the best efforts of courts and legislatures to
provide protection for honest references, employers remain unwilling to
provide meaningful information in response to reference requests. The
reality very well may be that any reasonable attempt to balance the
competing interests of employers and employees will still be
insufficient to prompt employers to provide more information.
However, by restating the rules regarding consent in the defamation
context, courts and legislatures may provide a greater measure of
fairness in what is likely to be a growing area of concern. In addition,
by clarifying these same rules, courts may provide employers with a
greater understanding of the important role and protection that the
defense of consent can provide in this context.
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